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RECENT CASES
Bills and Notes-Negotiability of Note Indorsed to Holder Ac-
companied by Assignment of Conditional Sale Contract-Defendant
contracted with seller to purchase a large mechanical press, and executed
a conditional sale contract and a promissory note on the same piece of
paper, separated by a perforated line. Seller assigned the contract and
indorsed the note to plaintiff. Subsequently seller failed to deliver the
press to defendant. Plaintiff sued on the note alone upon defendant's
refusal to pay. The court awarded judgment to plaintiff as a holder in
due course of a negotiable note. Commercial Credit Corp. v. -ange
County Mach. Wks., 208 P. 2d 780 (Cal. App., 2d Dist. 1949).The negotiability of a note attached to a conditional sale contract
depends on whether the promise to pay is rendered conditional by the con-
tract provisions. There has been a decided split of authority on this prob-
lem. Those courts holding the note non-negotiable in the hands of the
indorsee, who is also the assignee of the conditional sale contract, have done
so on the theory that the promise to pay in the note is deemed to be con-
ditioned on the payee's performance of his contractual duties,' since the
two instruments are part -of the same transaction and must be read to-
gether.2 Those courts holding the note negotiable, on the other hand, have
done so on the theory that each document is to be interpreted as a separate
entity,8 regardless of recitals on the notes that they are identified with the
conditional sale contract. 4 Some authorities have gone so far as to say
that even where the entire contract provisions have been incorporated
into the note, the latter is negotiable.5 In other decisions, the maker has
defended on the ground that the accompanying assignment of the conditional
sale contract prevented the indorsee from becoming a holder in due course.
The courts have rejected this contention, pointing out that notice of an
executory consideration does not so affect the indorsee's status.6
The decision in the instant case exemplifies the more logical approach
to the solution of an unsettled problem. The only apparent purpose of the
contemporaneous assignment of the conditional sale contract is for col-
lateral security.7 Where the note and the contract are separate documents
1. E. g., First & Lumbermen's Nat. Bank v. Buchholz, 220 Minn. 97, 18 N. W.
2d 771 (1945) ; State Nat. Bank v. Cantrell, 42 N. M. 389, 143 P. 2d 592 (1943).
See Aigler, Conditions in Bills and Notes, 26 MIcH. L. Rav. 471, 480, 495 (1928).
2. Von Nordheim v. Cornelius, 129 Neb. 719, 262 N. W. 832 (1935); Federal
Credit Bureau v. Zelkor Dining Car Corp., 288 App. Div. 379, 264 N. Y. Supp.
723 (1st Dept. 1933).
3. E. g., First State Bank v. Crain, 157 La. 427, 102 So. 513 (1924); North-
western Finance Co. v. Crouch, 258 Mich. 411, 242 N. W. 771 (1932).
4. National Bond and Investment Co. v. Lanners, 253 Ill. App. 262 (1st Dist.
1928) ; Shawano Finance Corp. v. Julius, 214 Wis. 637, 254 N. W. 355 (1937).
5. Peoples Loan and Finance Co. v. Ledbetter, 69 Ga. App. 729, 26 S. E. 2d
671 (2d Div. 1943); Abingdon Bank & Trust Co. v. Sbiplett-Moloney Co., 316 Ill.
App. 29, 43 N. E. 2d 857 (2d Dist. 1942).
6. E. g., Robertson v. Northern Motor See. Co., 105 Fla. 644, 142 So. 226 (1932);
B. A. C. Corp. v. Cirucci, 131 N. J. L. 93, 35 A. 2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
7. Petroleum Acc. Corp. v. Queen Anne Laundry Service, Inc., 265 App. Div.
692, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 495 (2d Dept. 1943).
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and both are transferred,8 or where the note alone is indorsed,9 references
on the note to the contract do not make the promise conditional, unless
the reference expressly states that payment is subject to the terms of the
contract.' 0 Logically, the attachment of the contract should not change
this result for the net effect is merely to add specific information about the
nature of the consideration for the note, and not to condition the promise
of the note upon the payee's performance." In the case of commercial
buyers of financial substance and extensive business experience, there ap-
pears to be no valid policy against a holding of negotiability. However, in
the case of consumers of low income and inferior bargaining position who
are ignorant of the possible liabilities, negotiability might be an unde-
sirable result, since the attachment of the contract and note might have
prevented a realization by the buyer that he was signing what purports
to be a negotiable note. Such a distinction, however, would be anomalous
to the general policy of the NIL that negotiability should be determined
with certainty by the content of the note itself,' 2 absent any express qualify-
ing reference to other writings, which policy is dictated by the business
practice of regarding negotiable instruments as money. The more de-
sirable solution of the problem of the consumer conditional buyer might
be to require the vendor to disclose in writing to the buyer the full extent
of his liability on the note to a holder in due course in the event of his
default, enforcing the regulation by criminal sanctions.'
3
Conflict of Laws-Insurance Receivership-Assets in Ancillary
State Delivered to Primary Receiver for Disfribution-Assets of de-
fendant insurance company, an insolvent New York Corporation, were
located in Pennsylvania. The ancillary receiver in Pennsylvania recom-
mended that these assets be distributed to Pennsylvania creditors only.
New York's primary receiver requested the assets be turned over to him
for equal distribution to all creditors everywhere, even though this would
reduce the shares of Pennsylvania creditors. The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, adopting the opinion of the lower court, ordered the assets
delivered to the primary receiver, since it appeared that New York would
make a pro rata distribution to all creditors wherever located. Common-
wealth v. Consolidated Indemnity & Insurance Co., 67 A. 2d (Pa. 1949).
8. E. g., Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co., 246 Ala. 36, 18 So. 2d 727 (1944);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Summers, 154 Miss. 501, 122 So. 541 (1929) ; Continental
Nat. Bank v. Conner, 214 S. W. 2d 928 (Tex. 1948).
9. E. g., U. S. v. Bryant, 58 F. Supp. 663 (S. D. Fla. 1945), aff'd, 157 F. 2d 767
(5th Cir. 1946) ; Fowler v. Industrial Acc. Corp., 101 Fla. 259, 134 So. 60 (1931) ;
Dorbrecker v. Downey Co., 88 Ind. App. 557, 163 N. E. 535 (1928); NEGOTIABLE
INsTRUuENTs LAW § 3 (2). But cf. International Harv. Co. v. Watkins, 127 Kans.
50, 272 Pac. 139 (1928); General Motors Acc. Corp. v. Garrard, 41 Idaho 151, 238
Pac. 524 (1925).
10. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 247 N. Y. 538, 161 N. E. 173 (1928).
11. See proposed codification of this result, A. L. I. AND NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
Com'Rs ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ART. III, §§ 3-105
(1)c and (2)a, 3-120 (2), 3-304 (6)b (May 1949 Draft); Comment, 57 YALE L. J.
1414 (1948). Note, however, that the assignee is subject to the buyer's defenses
against the seller in an action on the contract. First State Bank v. Crain, supra;
Auto Brokerage Co. v. Ullrich, 4 N. J. Misc. 808, 134 AtI. 885 (Circ. Ct. Hudson
Co. 1926). Contra, Commercial Credit Corp. v. Seale, 30 Ala. App. 440, 8 So. 2d
199 (2d Div. 1942).
12. See Aigler, supra note 1, at 495; Bailey, Negotiable Instruments and Con-
teinporaneously Executed Written Contracts, 14 TEx. L. Rav. 307 (1936).
13. See Note, 49 HARV. L. REv. 128 (1935).
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Insurance companies are expressly excluded from national bank-
ruptcy laws,1 and liquidation is accomplished pursuant to state statute.
2
The typical statute appoints as primary receiver the Insurance Commis-
sioner of the state of the company's residence,3 but since each state in
which assets are located has jurisdiction over those assets,4 a primary
receiver is not recognized by other than his own state except as a matter
of comity. 5 Ancillary receivers are appointed in other states to collect
funds located there, and these receivers may be directed to make dis-
tribution to claimants.6 But many courts, aware of the convenience and
saving of centralized administration, 7 are accustomed to remit assets from
their own state to the insurer's domicile.8 However, under this procedure
creditors may have to prove claims in the state to which assets are re-
mitted, and it is sometimes prohibitively expensive to prove a small claim
at great distance. 9  The feeling has existed that there may be discrimi-
nation in the primary state,10 even though such discrimination would
be unconstitutional." The Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act' 2 resolves
this conflict by providing that after two states have adopted the act, proof
of claim in one state will be binding on the other and that the ancillary
receiver shall release all assets to the primary receiver for distribution.'3
1. BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1938, § 4(a), 52 STAT. 845, 11 U. S. C. § 22(a) (1946)
amending BANKRuPTcY AcT oF 1898, 30 STAT. 547, 11 U. S. C. § 22(a) (1927).
2. Every state has some provision. See Comment, 33 COL. L. REv. 722, 724-726
(1933).
3. See, e. g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 § 206 (Purdon, 1930).
4. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254 (1891) (judgment against receiver in
state court binds only such property as is within the state where judgment rendered).
5, See, e. q., Boulware v. Davis, 90 Ala. 207, 8 So. 84 (1890); Castleman v.
Templeman, 87 Md. 546, 40 Atl. 275 (1898); RESTATEMENT, CoNFIacr OF LAWS
§ 564, comment a (1934); GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 589
(1949).
6. The analogy to administration of decedents' estates is pertinent See Reynolds
v. Stockton, supra, at 272. There is no preference to Pennsylvania creditors in the
distribution of insolvent estates of Pennsylvania decedents. FmucIARY's AT OF 1917,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 501 (Purdon, 1930) ; Instant case at 436.
7. See Brooks v. Smith, 290 Fed. 33, 39 (1st Cir. 1923); Bushwell v. Supreme
Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, 161 Mass. 224, 235, 36 N. E. 1065, 1069 (1894).
8. The question is to be answered in the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
Sands v. Greely & Co., 88 Fed. 130 (2d Cir. 1898) ; Receivers of Middlesex Banking
Co. v. Realty Investment Co., 104 Conn. 206, 132 Atl. 390 (1926); RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 553 (1934) ; see Comment, 41 YALE L. J. 757, 758 (1932).
9. Matter of People (Norske Lloyd Ins. Co.), 242 N. Y. 148, 168, 151 N. E.
159, 166 (1926) ; see Comment, 41 YALE L. J. 757, 760 (1932).
10. Fawcett v. Supreme Sitting of Order of Iron Hall, 64 Conn. 170, 29 Atl.
614 (1894) ; see Carpenter v. Ludlum, 69 F. 2d 191, 193 (3d Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
292 U. S. 655 (1934).
11. U. S. CoNsT. Art IV, §2; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 (1898) (Ten-
nessee statute giving Tennessee creditors priority held unconstitutional under clause
assuring equal privileges and immunities to the citizens of the several states). The
protection does not extend to corporations. See note 17 infra.
12. UNIFORM INsuRERs LIQUIDATION ACT, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CoN-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 232-239 (1939). Adopted by
ten states. See, e. g., ILL. ANN. STAT., tit. 73, §8 833.1-833.13 (Smith-Hurd, 1940) ;
MD. CODE Supp., Art 48A, §§ 65A-65G (1947); MIcH. Comp. LAWS, §§ 12270-11
to 12270-14 (Mason Supp. 1945); N. Y. INSURANcE LAW, §§ 517-524 (1939).
13. ". . In the event a claimant elects to prove his claim in ancillary pro-
ceedings . . . the final allowance of such claim by the courts in the ancillary state
shall be accepted as final... " HANDBOOK OF COMMISSIONERS, op. Cit. supra, note
12, §4(2), at 236; ". . . The ancillary receiver shall . . . promptly . . . trans-
fer . . . to the domiciliary receiver (all assets after deducting secured claims and
expenses)." Id. §3(2), at 235.
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The instant case, though an affirmation of cooperative practice al-
ready existing without sanction by the Pennsylvania court, 14 is a decided
departure from that court's decision in 1903 refusing to remit assets to
another state. 1 Although some courts require the posting of a bond to
assure fair treatment of local creditors before remitting assets to another
state, 16 no such security was here demanded. The Pennsylvania receiver
refused to readjudicate claims of Pennsylvania creditors already proved in
New York, thus indicating a clear disposition to regard proof of claims
in other states as final. Likewise, the court was willing to remit funds
to which a corporation made claim, even though corporations are not
entitled to constitutional protection as to equal distribution.17 This prac-
tice effectuates all but one important provision of the Uniform Act. There
it is provided that no creditor can attach assets located in any state which
has adopted the Act after primary proceedings have begun.'8 Two Penn-
sylvania decisions, however, indicate that attachment of assets of a foreign
company gives a valid lien if attachment is made before the appointment
of an ancillary receiver.' 9 But the more recent opinion considers that
this result is reached because the law of the other state would allow such
attachment to the prejudice of Pennsylvania creditors.2 0  The instant
court declares itself opposed to any precedent which will encourage re-
taliation by other states against Pennsylvania creditors. 21 Thus, it follows
that the court is also opposed to giving an attaching creditor priority
over a primary receiver, for that same treatment would be accorded to
Pennsylvania assets in another state. Clearly the court is disposed to
cooperate where all creditors will be treated alike, and it would seem this
would best be assured by adoption of the Uniform Act.
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Discrimination in Pri-
vately Owned State-Authorized Housing Project-Stuyvesant Town,
a housing project, refused to rent to plaintiff because he was a Negro.
Organized under the New York Redevelopment Law as a $90,000,000
subsidiary of the Metropolitan Insurance Company, the Town purchased
eighteen blighted blocks condemned by New York City, and rehabilitated
14. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. General Indemnity Corp. of America, Docket
No. 222 (Pa. C. P. 1933) ; Commonwealth v. Keystone Mutual Casualty Co., Docket
No. 129 (Pa. C. P. 1947).
15. Frowert v. Blank, 205 Pa. 299, 54 Atl. 1000 (1903) (refusal to remit based
on belief that New York creditors would be preferred to Pennsylvania creditors).
Distinguished in instant case at 437-438 on grounds that reasons justifying the de-
cision no longer exist.
16. People v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 161 N. Y. 492, 55 N. E. 1053
(1900); cf. Commissioner of Insurance v. National Life Insurance Co., 280 Mich.
344, 273 N. W. 592 (1937).
17. If claimant is a corporation, or not a citizen of a state, local creditors may
be preferred without denying privileges and immunities or due process. Blake v.
McClung, upra; GOODRICH, op. cit. supro, note 5, at 598.
18. HANDBOOX OF COMMISSIONERS, op. cit. supra, note 12, § 9, at 238.
19. Nazareth Cement Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 116 Pa. Super. 506, 177 Atl.
64 (1935). Smith v. Electric Machine Co., 83 Pa. Super. 143 (1924).
20. "No rule of comity requires that Pennsylvania courts should direct that
assets in Pennsylvania should be turned over to the receivers of a Louisiana Cor-
poration. It might be so if Louisiana would do the same." Nazareth Cement Co. v.
Union Indemnity Co., supra at 513, 177 Atl. at 67.
21. Instant case at 440.
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the area into 8,400 low rental apartments.' Metropolitan agreed to as-
sume all risks, the city agreeing to grant tax exemption for twenty-five
years. Plaintiff's suit to enjoin the Town's refusal to admit Negroes was
dismissed; the court held that Stuyvesant was a "private" activity, not
subject to constitutional restraints upon discrimination. Dorsey v.
Stuyvesant Town, 87 N. E. 2d 541, (Ct. of App., N. Y. 1949).
No state may, under the Fourteenth Amendment, deny its citizens
equal protection of the laws; this prohibition has long been held to apply
only to state, and not to private action.2 Today expanded governmental
participation in daily life makes it difficult to delineate the concept of
state action, but a fundamental belief that rights founded upon the concept
'of human dignity are superior to rights founded upon the sanctity of
property, has led the Supreme Court to broaden greatly the purview
of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Thus, the following have been held un-
constitutional state action: judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants
between private individuals; 4 racial discrimination by a labor union which
receives its bargaining rights by statute; 5 refusal of a privately owned
town to permit the dissemination of religious tracts on its streets; 6 racial
membership qualifications for a political party (even though declared to
be a private activity by the legislature); 7 and racial qualifications for
enrolling in the training school of a state subsidized, but privately en-
dowed and controlled free library.8 Throughout these decisions runs the
thesis that a vast private organization, whose function is quasi public and
whose discriminatory actions would affect many people, cannot do that
which the states are forbidden to do under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
The instant court seemed to disregard this approach in determining
whether Stuyvesant was a state or private organization. Its decision
was based upon evidence of a legislative intent that the Town be completely
free to choose its tenants, and upon a finding that there was no "direct"
exertion of state power in the project. But declarations of legislative in-
tent can neither lessen the scope of equal protection, nor alter the funda-
mental nature of Stuyvesant Town.'0 Moreover, under the decisions
above, the extensiveness of governmental participation in the organiza-
tibn is less determinative than the number of persons whose constitutional
rights are involved." In this case, that figure is impressive because it
includes not only Stuyvesant's 24,000 tenants, but the thousands more who
dwell or may soon dwell in similar projects, provided for by twenty-four
1. N. Y. UNcoNsoL. LAws. tit. 11 § 3415 (McK. 1949). See also, Metropolitan
Makes Housing Pay, 33 FoRTuNE 133 (Apr. 1946).
2. U. S. CoNsT. AmEND. XIV, § 1; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883). Dis-
senting vigorously, Justice Harlan objected to this narrowing of "equal protection,"
and declared that the "substance and spirit" of the Amendment was "sacrificed by a
subtle and ingenious criticism," warning that great injustices would follow. Id. at 19.
3. Schlesinger, The Supreme Court; 1947, 35 FORTUNE 73 (Jan. 1947) ; PRITcHETT,
T19E ROOSEVELT COURT (1948).
4. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
5. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 323 U. S. 192 (1944); Betts v. Easley,
161 Kan. 558, 169 P. 2d 831 (1946).
6. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1945).
7. Smith v. Alwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387
(4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U. S. 875 (1948).
8. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 149 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir.
1949).
9. See especially Marsh v. Alabama, supra at 506; Rice v. Elmore, supra at 390,
391; Smith v. Alwright, supra at 664.
10. Cf. Rice v. Elmore, mupra.
11. See note 9 supra.
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other states.12 These ventures were authorized by legislatures to alleviate
a public housing shortage, and only for this purpose may eminent domain
be exercised in their construction.' 3 Granting them immunity from the
Fourteenth Amendment, and allowing them to excludeNegroes, permits
them to ignore the most acute need for housing, since no other racial group
in the nation is more in need of relief.' 4  As long as the instant decision
stands unreversed, states will be able to avoid giving aid to Negro citizens,
while, simultaneously assisting the welfare of others. The inequities of
such a result can hardly be explained by legal niceties.
Constitutional Law-Trusts-Validity of Retroactive Statute
Authorizing Release and Termination by Beneficiary of a Spendthrift
Trust-Life tenant, sole beneficiary of a spendthrift trust for over
seventeen years, attempted, in accordance with a statute,1 to disclaim her
interest and thereby terminate the trust in favor of the remainderman.
The action of the executor in opposing termination was sustained by the
lower court. On appeal, the court affirmed on the ground that the statute,
as affecting previously existing trusts, violated the state constitution by
infringing on the testator's property right to have the trust carried out as
directed.2 In re Borsch's Estate, 67 A. 2d 119 (Pa. 1949).
It is generally accepted that no person may be compelled to accept a
gift against his will 3 and that a person may therefore refuse to become
the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust.4 Once he has accepted, however,
it has been held, in the absence of a statute such as that involved here,
that the beneficiary cannot terminate the trust by releasing his interest
since that would violate the testator's directions. 5 The problem of the
validity of a statute authorizing termination of a spendthrift trust through
release by the beneficiary, thus accelerating the remainderman's interest,
is one of first impression. Analogous Pennsylvania legislation, involving
12. Petition of Appellant for certiorari to the Supreme Court, p. 23 (October,
1949). Some of these statutes expressly forbid discrimination.
13. N. Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 3402, 3420 (McK. 1949); Murray v. LaGuardia,
180 Misc. 760, 43 N. Y. Supp. 2d 408 (Sup. Ct. 1943). See Nichols, The Meaning
of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Doinb, 20 B. U. L. Rv. 615, 631 (1940).
14. CLARK AND PERLMA, PREJUDICz AND PROPERTY 12-14 (1948). It should
be noted that granting plaintiff's injunction in this case would not mean that
Stuyvesant is compelled to rent to all Negroes who seek admission. It is only the
policy of refusing to rent to any Negro, which would be forbidden. No attempt
was made in the instant case to urge that Stuyvesant was free to exclude Negroes
as long as "separate but equal" facilities were provided for them elsewhere. Plessy
v. Fergurson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). This rule probably cannot be applied to housing
projects because it would amount to racial zoning, which is unconstitutional under
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917).
1. PA. STAT. ANN., tit 68, § 581 (Purdon, Supp. 1946), amending Act of May
28, 1943, P. L. 792. The purpose of this statute was to allow beneficiaries of spend-
thrift trusts certain benefits under federal tax laws. Instant case at 123.
2. PA. CONST. Art. I, § 9, providing that a man cannot "be deprived of his life,
liberty or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land."
3. In re Bute's Estate, 355 Pa. 170, 49 A. 2d 339 (1946).
4. Matter of Graham, 145 Misc. 628, 260 N. Y. Supp. 585 (Surr. Ct. 1932);
RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 36, comments c, d (1935); see Feeney's Estate, 293 Pa.
273, 284, 142 Atl. 284, 287 (1928) ; cf. Matter of Billet, 187 App. Div. 309, 175 N. Y.
Supp. 482 (2d Dep't 1919). Contra: Porter's Estate, 21 Pa. Dist. 330 (1912).
5. Matter of Caswell, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 507 (Surr. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 269 App. Div.
809, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 407 (4th Dep't 1945); Malatesta's Estate, 29 Pa. Dist. 113
(1919) ; Blackwell v. Virginia Trust Co., 177 Va. 299, 14 S. E. 2d 301 (1941).
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a modification of the testator's directions as to a spendthrift trust, provides
that the beneficiary's interest can be reached for the support of his wife
and children.6 The constitutionality of that legislation as applied to trusts
created before its passage has been upheld by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court, which found that no vested rights were violated and that the act
was a valid exercise of the state's police power.7 Among the other juris-
dictions, New York has taken the lead in passing statutes allowing credi-
tors to reach part of the beneficiary's income.8 The validity under the
Federal Constitution of such legislation applied retroactively has been up-
held.9 The court reasoned that a spendthrift trust, in preventing alien-
ation of the beneficiary's income to creditors, was similar to an exemp-
tion, in which there is no vested right, and that the legislation merely
lessened the exemption. 10 Tennessee, on the other hand, has declared un-
constitutional another statute reaching the beneficiary's income on the
ground that it violates the beneficiary's vested right." Pennsylvania ap-
pears to be the only jurisdiction which has found an "individual right of
property" -2 in the settlor, and this decision is the first by a state supreme
court to hold a statute unconstitutional because it violates that right.
13
How such a right can be derived from the state due process clause is
difficult to understand. 14 The instant court relies solely on the language
of cases dealing with the right of a beneficiary to terminate the spend-
thrift provisions while retaining the income,' 5 a clear violation of the testa-
tor's wishes. In this case, however, since the beneficiary could refuse the
legacy originally, and since, as the court admits, he could probably refuse
individual installments of income even after accepting,' 6 there would seem
to be no valid objection to allowing him to renounce altogether in favor
of the remainderman. 17 Even assuming, however, that this does amount
to a violation of the testator's wishes, the instant decision is unsatisfactory.
Since the very right to dispose of property by will is a statutory rather
than a natural right, any reasonable legislative modification of this right
6. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 1252 (Purdon, 1930); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48,
§136 (Purdon, 1930).
7. Everhart v. Everhart, 87 Pa. Super. 184 (1926). The issue of the statute's
constitutionality was before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Moorhead's Estate,
289 Pa. 542, 137 Atl. 802 (1927), but the court decided the case on other grounds.
8. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW, § 98 (creditors allowed to reach "surplus" income) ;
N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 684 (creditors allowed to reach ten per cent of income).
Eight other states have statutes of the former and three of the latter type. GRIswoLD,
SPENDTRI=FT TRUSTS, §§ 378-390.1 (2d ed. 1947).
9. Brearley v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001 (1911).
10. See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 391 (2d ed. 1947).
11. State v. Caldwell, 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S. W. 2d 624 (1944). See Brearley
v. Ward, supra at 377, 94 N. E. at 1008 (dissenting opinion).
12. Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts 547 (Pa. 1838). This language has been
cited in many subsequent Pennsylvania spendthrift trust cases: e. g., Heyl's Estate,
352 Pa. 407, 411, 43 A. 2d 130, 131 (1945); Riverside Trust Co. v. Twitchell, 342
Pa. 558, 561, 20 A. 2d 768, 770 (1941) ; Morgan's Estate (No. 1), 223 Pa. 228, 230,
72 Atl. 498, 499 (1909).
13. In Bonsall Estate, 65 Pa. D. & C. 251 (1948), which was followed by the
lower court in the instant case, this statute was considered unconstitutional when
applied retroactively, although the case was actually decided on the ground that the
statute was not retroactive.
14. See note 2 supra. See also GRISWOLD, SPE.NDTHRIFr TRUSTS, § 393 (2d ed.
1947).
15. See note 12 supra.
16. Instant case at 121.
17. See Stem, J., dissenting in the instant case at 124.
should be valid.' 8 This should be particularly true with respect to spend-
thrift trusts, which are supported more as a matter of policy than logic.'
9
Although the statute declared unconstitutional here was repealed before
this decision,20 the instant case is important in that its rationale places
serious limitations upon the power of the legislature to pass desirable
legislation affecting existing spendthrift trusts.
2 1
Criminal Law-Congressman Andrew May accepted pay from
war-contract seekers allegedly for intervening with the War Department
in their behalf. A federal penal statute prohibits the receipt of compen-
sation by a Member of Congress for services rendered before a govern-
mental agency. In a criminal proceeding, instituted against May and the
payors of the illegal compensation, Henry and Murray Garsson, all three
were convicted of conspiring to violate the above statute and to defraud
the United States. Convictions were likewise had on two counts which
charged May with the substantive offense of illegally receiving compensa-
tion, anit the Garssons with aiding and abetting May's offense. May v.
United States, 175 F. 2d 944 (D. C. Cir. 1949).
Duplicity in the Indictment-The first count was brought for
violation of the federal penal statute prohibiting conspiracy either to com-
mit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States
in any manner.2 The count, however, charged in the conjunctive rather
than the disjunctive, alleging substantially that the defendants had con-
spired to commi an offense,3 and to defraud the United States.
4 The
denial of defendants' motion to strike because of duplicity was affirmed
on the ground that the conspiracy was only one offense regardless of its
divers objects.
Traditionally, a single count charging more than one offense is du-
plicitous and therefore bad.5 The purpose of the rule against duplicity
seems to be founded on the theory of preventing prejudice to the accused.,
Not only will the defendant find it difficult to prepare his defense, but a
18. "The right to transmit or to receive property by will or through intestacy
is not a natural right but a creature of statutory grant." Tack's Estate, 325 Pa. 545,
548, 191 Atl. 155, 156 (1937). The inconsistency between the court's concept of a
property right in the testator and the statement quoted is obvious. See also 1 PAGE,
Wnzs, § 25 (3d ed. 1941).
19. See GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 554, 555 (2d ed. 1947).
20. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 301.3 (Purdon, Supp. 1948).
21. See note 8 supra, for examples of statutes which might be held unconstitutional
under this rationale.
1. 18 U. S. C. § 203 (1946). "Whoever, being a Member of . . . Congress
• . . receives . . . any compensation for any services rendered . . . in relation to
any proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other
matter to which the United States is a party or . . . interested, before any de-
partment . . . shall be fined not more than . . . This provision is now found
in 18 . S. C. § 281 (1948).
2. 18 U. S. C. § 88 (1946), now 18 U. S. C. § 371 (1948).
3. Violation of 18 U. S. C. § 203 (1946). See note 1 mrpra.
4. Defrauding here refers to usurping the government's right to have its
officials act honestly.
5. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a). Separate offenses must be charged in separate
counts. E. g., United States v. Dembowski, 252 Fed. 894 (E. D. Mich. 1918).
6. CLARK, CRIMINAL PRocuntR 330 (2d ed., Mikell, 1918). Duplicity is error
because defendant is subjected to confusion and embarrassment.
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verdict on such a count will be ambiguous and confusing because it is
never clear on which alleged offense the verdict was based. Since Con-
gress has not made an express declaration of its intention in drafting the
instant act, the courts have been left in the dark on the question of
whether one or two offenses were contemplated. But from the inception
of the statute, indictments have been brought that charged solely con-
spiracy to defraud,7 or conspiracy to commit an offense,8 and both in
separate counts. 9  In Sugar v. United States'0 the court explicitly re-
garded conspiracy to defraud the United States as one of the separate
and distinct offenses made punishable by the statute. An analysis of these
cases results in the conclusion that the courts consider that Congress
intended two different offenses and the inclusion of both in one count
would make it duplicitous. But United States v. Manton" apparently
departed from the above interpretation. The court there held only one
offense was described in a count that charged both a conspiracy to de-
fraud the United States and to violate a statute prohibiting the obstruc-
tion of the administration of justice.12 The Manton holding admittedly
was based primarily on Frohwerk v. United States-18 which seems to be
poor precedent since the count in question there involved only a con-
spiracy to violate a single provision of the Espionage Act of 1917 and
made no mention of a conspiracy to defraud. The instant decision, never-
theless, adopted the ruling of the Manton case in deciding that the count
charged one offense.
In the present case the prosecution had offered evidence to prove
the count as a whole, and the jury was charged that if it believed the de-
fendants had conspired to defraud the United States or to violate the
statute prohibiting a congressman from accepting a "bribe," it should
convict. It is apparent in this case that the evidence necessary to prove a
conspiracy to commit the offense would be the same as that necessary
to prove a conspiracy to defraud. For a conspiracy involving the ac-
ceptance of a bribe by a congressman amounts to a conspiracy to infringe
on the government's right to have its officials act honestly. Taking this
view, defendants were not injured by the form of the first count. It can-
not be said, however, that every indictment charging both a conspiracy
to defraud and to commit an offense would be sustained. There is little
7. E. g., United States v. Glasser, 116 F. 2d 690 (7th Cir. 1940), where de-
fendants were charged only with conspiracy to defraud. United States v. Newton,
48 Fed. 218 (S. D. Iowa 1891); United States v. Thompson, 29 Fed. 86 (C. C. D.
Ore. 1886).
8. E. g., United States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140 (1915) ; United States v. Britton,
108 U. S. 199 (1883). Defendants were charged only with conspiracy to commit
an offense.
9. E. g., McGregor v. United States, 134 Fed. 187 (4th Cir. 1904).
10. 252 Fed. 79, 83 (6th Cir. 1918). Where the defendants were charged with
conspiracy to violate the Selective Draft Act of 1917 and to defraud the United
States the court rejected the contention of duplicity because the charge of conspiracy
to defraud had been considered surplusage from the outset of the litigation. See
also Fuller v. United States, 114 F. 2d 698 (9th Cir. 1940).
11. 107 F. 2d 834 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 669 (1939). The con-
spiratbrs including Judge Manton were accused of conspiring to sell decisions and
doing sufficient overt acts to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy.
12. 18 U. S. C. § 241 (1946). ". . . who corruptly shall influence, obstruct,
or impede . . . the due administration of justice . . . shall be fined . . . or im-
prisoned . . . or both."
13. 249 U. S. 204 (1919). The count charged the defendants with conspiracy to
print in a newspaper twelve articles designed to obstruct recruiting by words of
persuasion in violation of the act. 40 STAT. 217, 219 (1917), repealed by 62 STAT.
862 (1948).
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doubt that the courts would strike down a count containing both where
the evidence tending to prove one was different than that tending to prove
the other.14 In thie event such a duplicitous count were allowed, the de-
fendants would be subjected to serious prejudice. However, absent this
prejudicial effect a patently duplicitous count may be upheld by the courts.
Applicability of Federal Aiding and Abetting Statute Where One
of the Necessary Parties to a Criminal Act is Not Expressly Punished
by the Statute Denouncing the Act-In affirming the conviction of
the Garsson brothers as aiders and abettors the court held that the failure
of the statute, prohibiting the illegal receipt of compensation by a con-
gressman, to make express provision for the punishment of the givers
of such compensation was no bar to the present indictment.
The federal penal code provides that one who aids, counsels, or pro-
cures the commission of a crime, as well as the actual offender, is punish-
able as a principal in the crime.Y5 Appellants contend, however, that this
provision has no application to an offense which requires concerted ac-
tion by two persons, where the statute condemning the act expressly
denounces one of the parties, without mentioning the other. The view
that the unnamed participant is not punishable as an accomplice has been
adopted by both federal and state courts in cases involving regulatory
statutes, where the prohibited act was not inherently unlawful. 16 A Cali-
fornia court took the same position with regard to a crime involving moral
turpitude, holding that an unmarried woman was not indictable under
the state adultery statute, since the statute provided for the punishment
of married offenders only.17 The United States Supreme Court applied
this reasoning in reversing the conviction of a woman for conspiracy to
violate the Mann Act.' 8 It would therefore seem that when Congress
fails to denounce one of the necessary parties to a prohibited act it reveals
an intent to exculpate him. Nevertheless, the decision in this case allows
indictment of the unnamed participant as an aider and abettor.
The instant court finds no evidence that Congress intended to make
an exception to the general aiding and abetting statute in the case of the
present offense. It rejects as inconclusive appellants' contention that, if
the payor were meant to be punished, the legislature would have so pro-
14. Consider joining in one count, for example, conspiracy to commit murder on an
Indian Reservation and to defraud the United States.
15. 18 U. S. C. § 550 (1946), now 18 U. S. C. § 2 (1948). This provision
abolishes the common law distinction between principals and accessories before the
fact.
16. E. g., Lott v. U. S., 205 Fed. 28 (9th Cir. 1913) (Indian purchaser not
chargeable with crime of soliciting and inciting offense of selling liquor to Indians) ;
State v. Teahan, 50 Conn. 92 (1882) (state aiding and abetting statute does not
apply to purchaser of liquor sold contrary to law) ; Com. v. Williard, 39 Mass. (22
Pick.) 47 (1839) (liquor purchaser not guilty of offense under local prohibition
law).
17. In re Cooper, 162 Cal. 81, 121 Pac. 318 (1912). But see Bisnor, STAT.
CIPMES § 659 (3d ed. 1901), where a contrary result is indicated in the absence
of a fornication statute, as was the case here. Cf. Reg. v. Brawn, 1 Car. & Kit.
144 (Assize, 1843) (unmarried person convicted of aiding and abetting the offense
of bigamy, though statute in express terms punished only the previously married
partner). See Bishop, op. cit. supra, §594.
18. The defendant was charged with consenting to her own interstate transporta-
tion for immoral purposes. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, said, at p.
123: ". . . we perceive in the failure of the Mann Act to condemn the woman's
participation in those transportations, which are effected with her mere consent, evi-
dence of an affirmative legislative policy to leave her acquiescence unpunished." Gebardi
v. U. S., 287 U. S. 112 (1932).
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vided, as it did in the adjacent code provision ' 9 where both the Mem-
ber of Congress and the giver are expressly denounced for doing the very
acts charged in the indictment here. The court might have pointed out
that this argument leads to the opposite conclusion on the issue of the
legislature's intent, by showing that Congress did not contemplate that the
payor of illegal compensation should escape punishment for his part in the
present transaction. Appellants' contention does, however, raise the
further question as to the government's reason for indicting the Garssons
with aiding and abetting the crime of another, when they might have
been charged under the adjoining code section as violators in their own
"right." A possible answer is found in the fact that such a charge might
have precluded the conspiracy indictment, thus restricting the scope of the
government's evidence.20 The abuse, by prosecutors, of the conspiracy
charge in order to make available less stringent rules of evidence has
been under judicial fire for some time.21 It would appear that the instant
decision gives tacit approval to that practice by permitting a rather ques-
tionable use of the aiding and abetting charge.
Indictment for Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Which Requires
Cooperative Action--In affirming the convictions, the court held that
since only May could commit the substantive offense of "accepting com-
pensation," the crime was not one requiring cooperative action, and
therefore the defendants could be indicted as conspirators for their agree-
ment to commit the offense.
It is well established that where two or more parties have committed
an offense to which cooperative action is essential they may not be in-
dicted for conspiracy to commit the offense. This doctrine has been ap-
plied in cases of dueling, bigamy, incest, adultery 2 2 and bribery.23  It is
reasoned that in such cases the conspiracy, i. e., the agreement, is such an
indispensable part of the substantive offense as to be merged in it. The
instant court draws a distinction where a statute punishes only the conduct
of one party to the illegal transaction. In United States v. Holte 24 a
conviction was upheld against both a man and woman for conspiring to
violate the Mann Act, the court reasoning that since a woman might
possibly be "transported" while drugged or unconscious, the offense might
be committed without her cooperation. This holding has been largely
overruled by a later case 2 5 which reasoned that Congress intended to
treat the women as victims and not as co-conspirators. In another case,
a court reluctantly upheld the conviction of a bootlegger for conspiring
with his purchaser to violate a prohibition statute which punished only the
seller.2 6 A conviction for conspiracy between a federal officer and a
19. 18 U. S. C. § 202 (1946), now 18 U. S. C. § 216 (1948).
20. This phase of the case is discussed in the following comment.
21. See note 30, infra.
22. 2 WHARTOxr, CRimiNAL. LAw § 1604 (12th ed. 1932).
23. United States v. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 664 (C. C. Neb. 1904). See United
States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354 (1925) ; United States v. Zeuli, 137 F. 2d 845 (2d Cir.
1943). The doctrine is generally still applied although there are several givers on
one side of the transaction and only one receiver on the other. See Thomas v. United
States, 156 Fed. 898, 904 (8th Cir. 1907).
24. See note 8 supra.
25. Gebardi v. United States, supra note 18.
26. Vannata v. United States, 289 Fed. 424 (2d Cir. 1923). After referring to
the scheme of indictment as an underhand 'way of doing something the legislature
never thought of, the court went on to say, "This indictment was a great stretch on
the part of the prosecutor of the quasi-judicial power lodged in him."
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private citizen to violate a statute prohibiting the "acceptance" of bribes
by federal officers has been affirmed,27 but the court said it felt bound
by the holdings in the Mann Act and the prohibition cases discussed above.
The instant court, relying on these cases, rejected the doctrine that parties
to a "cooperative crime" may not be indicted as conspirators and decided
that "accepting compensafion" did not require cooperative action so as to
preclude prosecution of both the receiver and the givers for conspiracy.
Where confederation by criminals increases their power to work op-
pression, legislatures have imposed a penalty for conspiracy. The crime
of conspiracy strikes at organized and syndicated crime.2 8  However,
where the cooperation involved is no greater than that necessarily required
between the giver and receiver of a bribe, their power to work oppression
does not materially increase and punishment for conspiracy seems un-
justified. The degree of cooperation remains unchanged whether one or
both parties to a collaborative crime are made punishable by the legisla-
ture. Since the hazards of confederation are no greater than before, the
distinction drawn in this case is one without a real difference. More-
over, another federal statute specifically prohibits compensating congress-
men for the procurement of government contracts,2 9 making it perhaps
unnecessary to charge a conspiracy to indict the Garssons for offering
the compensation. A reasonable inference is that the purpose of the con-
spiracy count was to avail the prosecutor of the looser presentation of
evidence allowed in conspiracy cases, a practice roundly condemned by
many eminent jurists.30 To the extent that this decision encourages the
unnecessary use of such procedure, its propriety is doubtful. The court
could have avoided this issue because the indictment charged a conspiracy
with two objectives, the second being to defraud the United States and
this requires no cooperative action. On this ground alone, the court
could have reached the desirable result without crippling a sound doctrine
by dissecting an otherwise indivisible transaction to find a crime where
none existed previously.
Evidence-Constitutionality of Statute Limiting Admission of
Prior Convictions-Defendant, on trial for murder, elected not to take
the stand at the trial. Nevertheless, evidence of sixteen previous convic-
tions for burglary was admitted over the defendant's objection that its
admission was prohibited by the Pennsylvania Criminal Evidence Act of
1947.1 The jury was instructed that it was to be considered only in the
event of conviction, to aid them in determining whether to impose a sen-
27. Ex parte O'Leary, 53 F. 2d 956 (7th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 830
(1931).
28. For an illuminative discussion of the growth and justification for conspiracy
punishments, see Sayre, Criminal Cotupiracy, 35 H.Av. L. REV. 393 (1922).
29. See note 19 .rpra.
30. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U. S. 440 (1948) ; United States v. Fal-
cone, 109 F. 2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1900) ; Note, 62 HARV. L. REv. 276 (1948).
1. PA. STAT. ANN., fit. 19, § 711 (Purdon, Suppi). 1948). "Section 1 . . . in the
trial of any person charged with crime, no evidence shall be admitted which tends to
show that the defendant has committed . . . any offense, other than the one where-
with he shall then be charged . . . unless,--One. . . . he has given evidence tend-
ing to prove his own good character . . . or, Two. He shall have testified at such
trial against a co-defendant. . . . Three. The proof that he has committed or been
convicted of such other offense is admissible evidence as to the guilt or the degree of
the offense wherewith he is then charged." Only section three, above, is new. The
rest of the act is a re-enactment of the 1911 act.
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tence of death or life imprisonment. Defendant's conviction was affirmed
on appeal, the court holding the act unconstitutional as being too vague.2
Commonwealth v. DePoji, 362 Pa. 229, 66 A. 2d 649 (1949).
Pennsylvania in 1911 passed an act 3 similar to the English Criminal
Evidence Act of 1898,' limiting cross-examination of the defendant as to
prior crimes.5 However, the provision of the English Act which allowed
admission of prior crimes when relevant to issues other than the defend-
ant's character was omitted. The Pennsylvania courts ignored the omis-
sion of this provision and, in accord with the general practice elsewhere,
continued to admit such "independently relevant" evidence. 6 In 1928 in
Commonwealth v. Parker 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that
the Act of 1925,8 allowing juries to fix penalties at either death or life
imprisonment in murder cases, implied that any prior conviction of a
crime of violence would have "independent relevance" in a murder trial
since it would aid the jury in determining whether to extend mercy.9 The
1947 Act adopts the provision omitted in the 1911 Act. However, due to
the decision' of the Parker case,10 Pennsylvania courts, without statutory
authorization, had been admitting prior convictions as relevant to guilt,
degree, or sentence while the new act makes them admissible only as to
guilt or degree. Thus, while the act appears to give statutory sanction to
the existing practice;1l in fact it limits the practice by refusing to sanc-
tion admission of convictions as relevant to sentence.
While the courts threw the act out as vague, they seemed to be moti-
vated by a policy based on the need to protect society from habitual
criminals. It is difficult to see how the act could be vague since it was
copied literally, with two minor changes, 12 from the English Act which
2. Also on the further grounds that (a) the title did not give *notice of the con-
tents of the act. The title is "An Act to amend . . . an Act regulating in criminal
trials the cross-examination of a defendant . . . by further providing what evidence
is or is not admissible." It is claimed that the failure of the title to specify that the
act also prohibits affirmative proof of prior convictions is fatal. (b) Even if the title
did give notice the act would be unconstitutional as containing more than one subject.
It is here claimed that affirmative proof and cross-examination are different subjects
within the meaning of the constitutional provission. ("No bill . . . shall be passed
containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." PA.
CONsT. Art. III, § 3.) The dissent answers by saying that there is one subject-"evi-
dence of prior convictions."
3. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 19, § 711 (Purdon, 1930).
4. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vice., c. 36.
5. At the time, it was felt that there was no need to extend the prohibition against
evidence of prior convictions to direct examination due to the rule that the state could
not initially attack the defendant's character. The 1947 act also applied to direct
examination since Commonwealth v. Parker, 294 Pa. 144, 143 At. 904 (1928) opened
the way to such direct attacks.
6. Commonwealth v. Coles, 265 Pa. 362, 108 AtI. 826 (1919) (not even citing
the statute); cf. Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 388 (1882) admitting such evi-
dence before Pennsylvania had any statute on this subject.
7. Commonwealth v. Parker, suPra.
8. PA. STAT. ANN'., tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon, 1945).
9. Contra: People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 148 Pac. 928 (1915) ; Farris v. People,
129 Il. 521, 21 N. E. 821 (1889).
10. Commonwealth v. Parker, supra.
11. See Note, Evidence of Defendant's Character in Pennsylvania Crininal Cases,
96 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 853 (1948) which says of the 1947 Act, "The General Assembly
has merely given its approval . . . of the construction placed on the Act of 1925
[by the Parker case]."
12. One difference was that the English Act, like the 1911 Act, applied only to
cross-examination. See note 5 spra. The English Act allowed evidence having
independent relevance as to "guilt" while the Pennsylvania act applies to "guilt or
degree." This is explained by the fact that there are no degrees of murder, nor of
any other crime, in England.
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had been successfully enforced for fifty years.' 3 The court admits, "If
we construe the Act of 1947 according to the canon of construction, that
Act would prohibit the introduction in the trial of a person accused of
murder, of evidence of any other crime for the purpose of fixing the ap-
propriate penalty." Then, ignoring the practice in other states, it goes
on to dismiss this construction on the ground that "the fixing. of the
penalty would therefore be largely an arbitrary matter." Though thirty-
four states allow the jury to fix sentence in first-degree murder cases, only
Pennsylvania has given the prosecution the right initially to bring the
defendant's character into issue.14 Having had to face the dilemma of
either allowing a professional criminal to plead for mercy with a jury
unaware of his record, or else admitting evidence which raises prejudice
without proving guilt, Pennsylvania alone has accepted the latter choice.15
The most satisfactory means for dealing with this problem would probably
be the use of split verdicts, wherein the jury would receive evidence
relevant to fixing sentence only after a verdict of guilty has been brought
in.
1 6
Income Taxation-Deductibility of Legal :Expenses Incurred in
the Determination of Gift Tax Liability-Taxpayer made a gift from
income producing property and filed a gift tax return. He was notified
of a deficiency and incurred legal expenses in effecting its substantial
modification. Taxpayer then sued for a refund of overpayment of his
income tax attributable to his legal expenses claiming their deductibility
under § 23 (a) (2). 1  He contended that the deficiency assessment had
been excessive and that it had threatened to consume most of his remain-
ing income producing property. Taxpayer was allowed the refund and the
provision of the Treasury Regulations 2 disallowing the deduction of gift
tax determination expenses was held in conflict with § 23 (a) (2). Lykes
v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 537 (S. D. Fla. 1949).
Section 23 (a) (2) was enacted to give investors the right to deduct
expenses essential to the production of income.3 Applicable Treasury
Regulations originally disallowed the deduction of expenses incurred to
13. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vicr., c. 36.
14. Pennsylvania allows the state to attack the defendant's character only in mur-
der cases, since, character being relevant to sentence only there is no excuse for sub-
mitting prior convictions to the jury in other trials wherein the jury does not fix
sentence. The only analogy to this, wherein the jury gets the defendant's record, is
the practice under some Habitual Offender's Acts, providing additional sentences for
repeated violations. However, such a practice is adopted in a minority of jurisdictions
and never applies in any crime as serious as murder.
15. There have been sporadic attempts to limit the admission of such evidence.
E. g., Commonwealth v. Clark, 322 Pa. 321, 185 AUt. 764 (1936) ("only [against] pro-
fessional criminals . . . or where the murder is cold-blooded or atrocious").
16. 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 194b (3d ed. 1940). The Revised Penal Code (Senate
Bill 243) provided for such split verdicts in Pennsylvania murder cases. However,
this bill was vetoed on other grounds. See Legal Intelligencer, May 3, 1949.
1. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (a) (2) provides that an individual may deduct from gross
income "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year for the production or collection of income, or for the management, conservation,
or maintenance of property held for the production of income."
2. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b) (1943), as amended by T. D. 5513,
1946-1 Cum. BULL. 61, 62. See note 8 infra.
3. H. R. RFP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 74-76 (1942); SEN. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1942); 87 CONG. Rac. 7346 (1941); 88 CONG. REC.
6376 (1942). For a thorough discussion of the genesis of § 23(a) (2) see Brodsky &
McKibbin, Deduction of Non-Trade or Non-Businexs ExPenses, 2 TAX L. REV. 39,
40-44 (1946).
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contest proposed additional tax assessments.4  The Supreme Court in
Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner 5 held that this provision was incon-
sistent with § 23 (a) (2) because it did not give proper effect to the
words "for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income." In that case trustees, after expira-
tion of the trust, contested an income tax deficiency. The Court, tak-
ing the view that trust property is held for the production of income until
the distribution of trust assets is complete, allowed the deduction of their
legal expenses because they were a proximate result of the management
of property held to yield income. 6 The Treasury Regulations have since
been aniended to conform with the Supreme Court's interpretation of
§ 23 (a) (2).7 To forestall a more liberal construction of § 23 (a) (2)
based on the word "conservation" they now provide that the expenses
of contesting any liability shall not become deductible because income
producing property may be consumed in satisfaction of it. Gift tax con-
test expenses are excluded as an illustration of this provision.8 Its
validity was questioned in Cobb v. Commissioner 9 where the provision
was sustained on consideration of the language and purpose of § 23 (a)
(2). The Tax Court in that case answered the contention that the gift
tax litigation expenses involved were incurred in an attempt to conserve
income producing property. It said that expenses incurred in the defense
of any alleged liability which might result in a forced sale of income
producing property to satisfy such liability would be deductible if the
argument should prevail. 10 The circuit court in affirming the Tax Court
distinguished the Bingham case declaring it to be no authority for the
proposition that gift tax litigation expenses are deductible on the ground
that income producing property was protected by their expenditure.
In the instant case the district court without sufficient explanation
relies on the Bingham case as authority for allowing the deduction of
the gift tax determination expenses. The applicability of the Bingham
case is doubtful. In that case the income tax litigation expenses were
held to be a proximate result of the holding of property for income pur-
poses by trustees, whereas in the instant case, the gift tax litigation ex-
penses seem to have been the proxiniate result of the voluntary distri-
bution of income producing property by an individual." Thus, there is
4. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.23(a)-15(b) (1943). An exception was made in
the case of taxes on property held for the production of income.
5. 325 U. S. 365 (1945). See Brodsky & McKibbin, spra note 3, at 55 et seq.;
Note, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 251, 256 (1948).
6. Bingham's Trust v. Comm'r, supra, at 367. The Court applied the test of Korn-
hauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145 (1928) that an expense is deductible if directly
connected with or proximately resulting from the enterprise. That test is now ap-
plicable to the "business" and "non-business" provisions of § 23 (a).
7. T. D. 5513, supra note 2. They now provide that all expenses incurred in the
determination of income tax liability are deductible. It has been submitted that this
provision exceeds the authority of § 23(a) (2), but is justifiable on the ground of ad-
ministrative expediency. Brodsky & McKibbin, supra note 3, at 60, 64.
8. T. D. 5513, supra note 2. An exception is made in the case of expenses allo-
cable to interest on a refund of gift taxes.
9. 10 T. C. 380 (1948), aff'd, 173 F. 2d 711 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 18 U. S.
L. WEEK 3088 (U. S. Oct. 10, 1949).
10. Id. at 384. Thus, the Tax Court in this case unequivocally abandoned its former
position with regard to the "conservation" argument. That argument had been sus-
tained in Bingham's Trust v. Comm'r, 2 T. C. 853, 859 (1943), along with the
"management" argument; and in Connelly v. Comm'r, 6 T. C. 744, 748 (1946).
11. Cf. Bagley v. Comm'r, 8 T. C. 130, 135 (1947) (denied deduction of expenses
for advice concerning the establishment of a trust for benefit of taxpayer's minor
daughter).
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no doubt that any expense incurred in the production of income is deduc-
tible, but one which is not incident to any activities for that purpose may
not be deducted. If the instant decision rests on the ground that the tax-
payer acted'to conserve income producing property by contesting the ex-
cessive deficiency assessment, the deductibility of all the defense expenses
that would logically come under § 23 (a) (2) would turn solely on the
coincidence of the, taxpayer's owning income producing property. This
would attribute to Congress an intent to discriminate which would result
in a more serious injustice than that discussed at some length by the dis-
trict court in the instant decision..
2
Income Taxation-Deductibility of Penalty as "Ordinary and
Necessary" Business Expense-Petitioner voluntarily disclosed inno-
cent violations of price ceilings to the OPA. Unable to recompense his
customers, petitioner paid the Administrator the amount of the over-
charges. The Commissioner disallowed deduction on income tax state-
ment of the payment. In a suit for refund, the court upheld the peti-
tioner's claim that it was deductible as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense because this allowance did not frustrate the policy of the
OPA statute. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F. 2d 711
(2d Cir. 1949).
Section 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code allows de-
ductions from gross income of "ordinary and necessary" business ex-
penses. This broad allowance has been held to include civil judgments I
as well as legal expenses incurred in defending or initiating civil suits
when they arise in the course of business.2  However, courts have ex-
cluded from this deduction expenditures to accomplish objectives in frus-
tration of governmental policy.3 Torts against the Government which are
also crimes give rise to non-deductible judgments or penalties. 4 More-
over, until this decision courts have uniformly held that no penalty is
deductible 5 rationalizing that the expenditure was not one necessary to
obtain profits,6 that since it was an illegal act it could not be necessary, 7
12. Taxpayer had been notified of a deficiency of $145,276.50, and of his right to
petition for a redetermination within 90 days, under § 1012 of the Code. The modified
deficiency was $15,612.75. In view of the excessiveness of the assessment and the
rigidity of the procedure under § 1012 the taxpayer was actually compelled to incur
legal expenses amounting to $7,263.83, in order to protect himself from a. lien against
his property. In reference to § 23 (a) (2) the district court said: ". . . to hold that
such law denies taxpayer the right to contest such assessment, except at his own
personal expense, just isn't justice under the law." The circuit court in the Cobb case,
supra, recognized a similar injustice in the case before it, but holds that § 23(a) (2)
cannot remedy it.
1. E. g., Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F. 2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
2. E. g., Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145 (1928).
3. E. g., Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U. S. 326 (1941)
(lobbying expenses) ; Wagner v. Commissioner, 30 B. T. A. 1099 (1934) (losses sus-
tained by confiscation by District Attorney of usurious loan office's records).
4. Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F. 2d 363 (7th Cir. 1942).
5. E. g., Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir.
1931).
6. E. g., Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Commissioner, supra, which relied on
Inland Revenue Comm. v. von Glehn, [1920] 2 Y. B. 553.
7. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F. 2d 878 (2d Cir.
1937).
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or that allowance would mitigate the force of the penalty.8  "Penalty" has
been generally held to include all non-tax payments to federal and state
governments for statutory breaches which are not contractual. 9 Moral
character of the breach was considered irrelevant 10 as was the practical
difficulty of perfect compliance. 1 In these cases attorney's fees had been
allowable only in so far as the defense was successful.12  The tide of the
law shifted sharply when the Supreme Court held deductible attorney's
fees for an unsuccessful defense of a penal action arising in the course of
business as long as the deduction did not frustrate the policy of the statute
imposing the penalty. 13  It was not thought that this meant the penalties
themselves were deductible, 14 but in the instant case the court used the
policy maintenance principle to hold deductible this payment for an
innocent overcharge which it reluctantly termed a penalty.
Different policy considerations arise in allowing deduction of costs
of an unsuccesful defense against a penalty -and in allowance of the
penalty itself. Since it is fundamental that an accused is innocent
until proved guilty, legal expenses incurred in his defense are
presumptively costs of warding off an unjustified judgment. When an
appellate court grants cognizance of a dispute there is sufficient merit in
the case to warrant the defendant's resistance. Good faith, the severity
of the penalty, 'and the interests of society served by an authoritative in-
terpretation of unsettled law are all good reasons for imposing no further
expense upon the defendant.' 5 On the other hand, penalties are exac-
tions by the sovereign for unlawful conduct and warrant no mitigation in
their effect. To so hold would lessen their sanction, thus weakening an
effective method of enforcing social policy. Even if we accept the prin-
ciples laid down by this court the decision is still unjustified. The
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 states as its purpose the preven-
tion of inflation. 16 Any surcharge in a sale reduces purchasing power
which is in direct conflict with the policy of the Act. Although the un-
lawful excess profit was siphoned off by payment of the penalty to the
government, the original inflationary pressure on the consumer remained.'
7
Allowance of the deduction here lets this breach of policy go unpunished
since all that was paid to the government was the unjustified surcharge.
8. Great Northern Ry. v. Commissioner, 40 F. 2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930).
9. E. g., United States v. LaFranca, 282 U. S. 568, 573 (1931) ; United States v.
Jaffrey, 97 F. 2d 488 (8th Cir. 1938) (assessment on delinquent taxes) ; Gould Paper
Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F. 2d 698 (2d Cir. 1934) (state anti-trust law) ; Chicago, R.
I. & P. Ry. v. Commissioner. 47 F. 2d 990 (7th Cir. 1931) (Hours of Service Law,
Safety Appliance Law, etc.). Contra: Amato v. Porter, 157 F. 2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946).
10. Helvering v. Hampton, supra; Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Commis-
sioner, supra.
11. For a broad treatment of the whole problem, see Note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 852
(1941).
12. National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, supra (Anti-Trust
action, part of prosecution dropped, part settled by compromise, legal expenses de-
ductible only as to former part).
13. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U. S. 467 (1943) (suit to enjoin fraud order
prohibiting further use of mails for "puffing" advertising of mail-order prosthetics firm.
The Court said the policy of the penalizing Act was to prevent fraud by the mails and
the deduction allowance in no way frustrated it).
14. Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir.
1945).
15. Commissioner v. Heininger, supra.
16. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U. S. C. App. § 901(a) (1946).
17. Had the payment been made to petitioner's customers no inflationary pressure
would have resulted and the commissioner would have allowed the deduction. I. T.
3630, 1943 Cum. BuLL. 113.
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While it is not the function of taxation to impose a penalty, it is certainly
not the function of the courts to remove the naturally resulting punitive
force from penalties imposed for acts contrary to public policy. Penalties
for violation of OPA have been held not deductible before without regard
to the petitioner's moral conduct,' 8 but this court maintains that deduc-
tions may be made when the overcharges are not wilfull or negligent, thus
rendering mens rea significant in an offense condemned in the statute as
malum prohibitum. 19
Income Taxation-Includibility as Income of Deposits for Secu-
curity, Future Rent or Part Payment for Property Under an Option
to Purchase-Petitioner leased property for ten years. The lease pro-
vided for deposits of money as security for the lessee's performance of his
obligations. The deposits, if not needed as security, were to be applied to
the last month's rent, or as a part payment for the property under an op-
tion to purchase obtained with the lease. Petitioner reported the pay-
ments received as income when it became ascertained that they would
be applied as rent. The court upheld the Commissioner's contention that
the proceeds were taxable income when received, on the theory that not
only had taxpayer the unrestricted use of the proceeds, but also he was
not required to refund them, and only upon a contingency would they
become anything but rent. Gilken Corp v. Commissioner, 176 F. 2d
141 (6th Cir. 1949).
Payments to be applied to future rent have been held taxable income
when received, whether taxpayer is on a cash or accrual basis,' under the
"claim of right" doctrine.2  However payments held solely as security
have been held not taxable when received, since it is not known whether
they will ever become income.3 Likewise payments toward the purchase
price of the property, under an option to purchase, are not generally held
taxable income when received, since it cannot be told whether the pay-
ments are income or a return of capital until it is known that the option
will or will not be exercised.4 Where payment is made as a credit against
future rent and as security, no general principle can be laid down. In
Clinton Hotel v. Commissioner,5 payment labeled "security" was held not
taxable income when received, since as a security payment it might never
18. Garibaldi & Cuneo v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 446 (1947); Scioto Provision
Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T. C. 439 (1947).
19. The decision can be criticized also for the practical burden it throws on tax
commissioners who must dispose of deduction pleas for penalties imposed by the num-
berless agencies of federal and state governments.
1. Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F. 2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Astor Holding Co. v. Com-
missioner, 135 F. 2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943).
2. This doctrine was first stated by Justice Brandeis in North American Oil
Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 424 (1932), as follows: "If a taxpayer receives
earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has
received income [for tax purposes], even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain [it], and even though he still may be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent."
3. Warren Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F. 2d 723 (2d Cir. 1940).
4. Hunter v. Commissioner, 140 F. 2d 954 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Virginia Iron, Coal
and Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F. 2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U. S.
630 (1939).
5. 128 F. 2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942).
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become income. This case has not been followed,6 probably because it is
felt that merely using the term "security" is not sufficient to alter its
character as prepaid rent. Thus, in another leading case, the court re-
fused to accept the label, determining that the payment was taxable in-
come when received on the basis of a finding that the payment was
primarily intended as future rent.
7
The court in the instant case was faced with a difficult problem. The
payments could eventually have become either rent, taxable when re-
ceived, or a return of capital, not taxable as income at all.8 The court
reasoned that since the taxpayer had the unrestricted use of the pro-
ceeds it was taxable when received. This rationale affords no logical
basis for the holding since the indiscriminate use of this "claim of right"
doctrine in the past has rendered it a meaningless generality., A better
solution, perhaps, would be to determine whether the payment was tax-
able income when received by examining the primary purpose for which
it was made.' 0 This approach is not without precedent." In fact, there
is reason to believe that courts look to this test first in determining whether
or not .to fix liability by applying the label "claim of right." 12 Specifically
the application of this test in the instant case, without changing the result,
would lessen the possibility of disturbing the comparatively settled prin-
ciple that part payments for property, under an option to purchase, are not
taxable when received.
Income Taxation-Sale by Stockholders of Property Received in
Liquidation of Corporation Held Taxable to Corporation-The presi-
dent of a family corporation conducted negotiations for the'sale of an
apartment building, the corporation's sole asset. After agreement had
been substantially reached, the stockholders (the family of the president)
contracted that after causing the property to be conveyed to them by
way of liquidation of the corporation, they would transfer it to the prospec-
tive purchaser. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue declared that
6. E. g., Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 912 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 750 (1944) ; Detroit Consolidated Theatres. Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 133 F. 2d 200 (6th Cir. 1942) (facts to be found in P-H 1941 BTA MEm. DEc.
f 41,403 (1941))..
7. Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 912 (2d Cir 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 750 (1944).
8. An argument can be made that, even if there is a possibility that the payment
will become a return of capital, it should not be taxed when received, since injustice
might result. However, the government should not allow an unlikely contingency to
cause a delay in its collection of taxes. First, because such things as the subsequent
insolvency of the taxpayer might thwart the government in its attempt to collect the
taxes, and also because it would, create a loophole for evasion of the taxation of all
sums received in advance of the period of earnings.
9. For examples of how the courts have distinguished and disregarded the "claim
of right" test, see Clinton Hotel v. Commissioner, 128 F. 2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942) (dis-
tinguished) ; Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 912 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U. S. 750 (1944) (disregarded) ; Comment, Taxing Unsettled In-
come: The "Claim of Rqht" Test, 58 YALE L. J. 955 (1949) ; Note, 22 IND. L. J. 99
(1946).
10. This was the theory of the Tax Court in the instant case. Gilken Corp. v.
Commissioner, 10 T. C. 445 (1948).
11. See, for example, the court's treatment of payment for security and future
rent in Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F. 2d 912 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 750 (1944) ; and similarly, the court's treatment of state inflicted
burdens on interstate commerce in South Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rer. Sullivan, 325
U. S. 761 (1945).
12. See note 9 supra.
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this was a corporate sale and asserted a deficiency in tax due based on
the gain realized. The circuit court, affirming the decision of the Tax
Court,1 held that the corporate president must be assumed to have acted
on behalf of the corporation, in spite of uncontradicted evidence that he
represented the stockholders as individuals.2  Kaufmann v. Commissioner,
175 F. 2d 28 (3rd Cir. 1949).
A distribution in kind by a corporation of its appreciated property as
a liquidating dividend is not taxed as a realization of gain by the corpora-
tionp3 but is taxed to each stockholder when the value of what he receives
exceeds his st6ck investment.4 On the other hand, a sale of the property
by the corporation would subject it to a tax on the gain realized,5 and
the stockholder may also be subject to a tax on the distribution of the
proceeds from the sale.6 To avoid this double taxation, stockholders of
many closely held corporations have followed practices similar to those
employed in the instant case. The probability of the success of such prac-
tices has decreased sharply in recent years as the Commissioner, with the
aid of the courts, has expanded the doctrine that the substance of trans-
actions should not be disguised by mere formalities. 7  By use of this
elastic dogma, technicalities have been seized upon to justify the allocation
of the sales to the corporation,8 without contravening the acknowledged
right of taxpayers to decrease or entirely avoid the payment of taxes by
following procedures which the law permits.9 Substantial reliance has
been placed on the corporate-negotiation theory, whereby if it could be
shown that a major part of the successful negotiations were conducted
by the corporation, subsequent distributions to the stockholders, followed
by their transferring the property to the purchaser, will not have the
effect of substituting the stockholders for the corporation as the true
vendor.10  Conversely, courts have refused to attach liability to corpora-
tions where there were no negotiations pending by either the corporation
or stockholders when liquidation was initiated," or where they have been
convinced that irrespective of the time of negotiations, the sales were es-
sentially those of the stockholders.1
2
1. 11 T. C. 483 (1948).
2. Only two witnesses were called. Mrs. Rose Kaufmann, one of the petitioners
and stockholders, stated that Samuel Hyman, her father and corporate president, was
acting for the stockholders as individuals. The other witness was the president of the
purchasing corporation who testified that it was his impression that Mr. Hyman was
acting for his wife and daughters. The Tax Court concluded that all witnesses could
be implicitly believed. The circuit court observed, however, that Mr. Hyman was not
called upon to refute the contention that he was acting for the corporation. See
Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T. C. 1158, 1164 (1946) where
the court noted that the taxpayer failed to produce as witnesses its officers who were
qualified to testify concerning the facts in dispute. Undoubtedly. the failure of tax-
payers to produce its most qualified personnel as witnesses has an adverse effect on
their cases.
3. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.22(a)-20 (1943).
4. INT. REV. CODE § 115 (c).
5. U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-18 (1943).
6. INT. REv. CODE §§ 115(a), 115(c).
7. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U. S. 331 (1945).
8. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., .rupra; Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v.
Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 513 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Fairfield Steamship Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 157 F. 2d 321 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Commissioner, 144
F. 2d 282 (3d Cir. 1944).
9. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
10. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., mcpra.
11. Commissioner v. Falcon Co., 127 F. 2d 277 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Williams v. Com-
missioner, 3 T. C. 1002 (1944).
12. Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F. 2d 319 (5th Cir. 1947).
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In the instant case, the evidence supported the taxpayer's contention
that the president was acting for the stockholders as individuals. 13  All
the stockholders consented to the arrangement, and it does not appear
reasonable to state that the corporation was injured by being deprived of
the sale, since the resulting proceeds would have been distributed to the
stockholders. Therefore the court's contention that the president must be
assumed to have acted on behalf of the corporation, because of the existing
fiduciary relationship,14 seems fallacious. However, its conclusion in al-
locating the sale to the corporation represents a realistic approach to the
problem of enforcing congressional intent in the field of corporate taxation.
In the absence of specific legislation indicating approval of the inequities
that now exist in ofir tax law,'5 court decisions should have the effect of
further equalizing the tax burden among all individuals. Rather than rely-
ing on the fiduciary relationship dogma, which could easily be circum-
vented, 16 the holding could have been more strongly supported by the
theory that no tax-free liquidation occurred, since the stockholders, by
being obligated to transfer the property upon receiving it, never had full
ownership and dominion over it.1 One should not be allowed to throw
the tax gatherer off the scent by taking a meaningless step in routing
the title from the corporation to the purchaser.'8 To hold otherwise would
result in placing a premium on cleverly devised schemes designed, if as-
siduously followed, to subvert the purpose of the taxing statutes-a con-
clusion that would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax
policies of Congress.
Labor Law-Wage-Hour Act-Stipulated Regular Rate of Pay
Combined with Guaranteed Salary for Irregular Workweek-An em-
ployer hired certain clerks on a weekly guaranteed salary basis. There
was an oral understanding, however, that this salary was computed at a
stipulated rate per hour for 40 hours, with time and one-half for overtime.
The guaranteed salary covered all amounts due for time and overtime up
to 48 hours; if more than 48 hours were worked, additional compensation
at time and one-half the stipulated rate was paid. The Wage-Hour Ad-
13. See note 2 supra.
14. 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPoRATioNs § 838 (Rev. vol. 1947). "Directors
and other officers, while not trustees in the technical sense in which that term is used,
occupy a fiduciary relation to the stockholders as a body. . . . It is their duty to
administer the corporate affairs for the common benefit of all stockholders, and
exercise their best care, slll, and judgment in the management of the corporation
solely in the interest of the corporation."
15. Stockholders of a corporation which is able to distribute liquidating dividends
in kind have a definite tax advantage over those of corporations which must first sell
their property and then distribute the proceeds from the sale. See notes 3-6 incl.,
supra.
16. An implication of the court decision is that if the stockholders were repre-
sented by a party who had no official connection with the corporation, the sale would
not have been allocated to the corporation.
17. This proposition is being advanced by the Government in its petition for cer-
tiorari filed with the Supreme Court (October Term, 1949) in case of Cumberland
Public Service Co. v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 843 (Ct. Cl. 1949). If the petition
is granted, the subsequent decision by that court should aid substantially in clearing
the air of uncertainty that currently prevails in this field of taxation. But see Magill,
Sales of Corporate Stock or Assets, 47 COL. L. Rtv. 707, 717 (1947).
18. Income taxes cannot be avoided by methods, devises, anticipatory arrange-
ments, or contracts which merely give ill-founded comlexion to the reality of the
transaction. Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 355 (1939); Lucas v. Earl, 281
U. S. 111 (1930).
[Vol. 98
RECENT CASES
ministrator challenged the validity of the contractual hourly rate, alleging
that it was artificial, and not in accord with statutory requirements. In
affirming a judgment dismissing the Administrator's complaint, the court
ruled that the statutory "regular rate" of pay of these employees was the
stipulated rate. McComb v. Pacific & Atlantic Shippers Ass'n., 175 F. 2d
411 (7th Cir. 1949).
Section 7 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act requires employees
working over 40 hours per week to be compensated for such excess hours
at "not less than one and one-half times the regular rate" at which em-
ployed.' In the ordinary case, the "regular rate" is total weekly remunera-
tion divided by the number of hours actually worked.2  Moreover, where
there is a guaranteed weekly wage without any express provision for an
hourly rate, even though it was intended to include overtime, this rule ap-
plies and no effect is given to the guarantee. 3 Until recently the Wage-
Hour Administrator has contended that the same rule applies notwithstand-
ing a stipulation of an hourly rate, where the wage actually paid is in fact
governed by the guarantee.4  This contention was refuted by the Supreme
Court in 1942 in Walling v. Belo Corporation.5 Thereafter, however, the
Administrator's position was strengthened by the language of three opin-
ions refusing to give effect to stipulated hourly rates under constant wage
plans that lacked an effective or fair guarantee. 6 Encouraged, in 1947 the
Administrator carried to the Supreme Court a case in which the factual
situation was indistinguishable from the Belo case; but the Court again
applied the Belo doctrine, and held that a bona fide, contractual wage rate
not less than the statutory minimum, although accompanied by a fair
guarantee, may be regarded as the "regular rate" of pay.7 This case should
1. The Act applies only to employees engaged in interstate commerce or in the
production of goods for interstate commerce. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C.
§§203(b), 203(j), as amended Pub. L. No. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3(a), 3(b)
(Oct. 26, 1949).
2. The Fair Labor Standards Act amendments define "regular rate" as including
all remuneration for employment, except that certain types of payments, e. g., Christmas
gifts, are excluded. Pub. L. No. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (Oct. 26, 1949). Under
the original Act, which contained no definition of "regular rate", the Supreme Court
ruled that it means "the hourly rate actually paid for the normal, non-overtime work-
week." Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U. S. 37, 40 (1944).
3. Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572 (1942).
4. To illustrate these rules: Example 1.-E, an employer, hires C, a clerk, at $52
for a workweek of 40 hours. C's regular rate of pay is $1.30 per hour [$52 -.- 40]. Ex-
ample 2.-E hires C at $52 per week, and the contract specifies that this wage is to
cover all hours not in excess of 48 in any week. In this situation the regular rate will
likewise be wage divided by hours' worked, and no effect will be given to the guarantee.
This is the Overnight Trats. Co. case, supra. Example 3.-E hires C at $52 per week,
and the contract specifies that the regular rate of pay shall be $1.00 per hour. In
this situation, if C ordinarily worked 48 hours, it is not likely that the Administrator
would ever have questioned the bona fides of the contractual rate. On the other hand,
if C usually worked only 40 hours per week, and only occasionally worked 48, in the
past the Administrator would likely have contended that the stipulated rate was not
the regular rate; and that for weeks in which C worked over 40 hours he should receive
additional overtime compensation.
5. 316 U. S. 624 (1942). The Court's holding that a stipulated hourly rate may
be regarded as the regular rate notwithstanding a fair guarantee of a minimum weekly
wage has since become known as the Belo doctrine.
6. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, supra (split day plan); Walling v. Younger-
man-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U. S. 419 (1945) (piece work plan) ; Walling v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U. S. 427 (1945) (piece work and incentive bonus plan).
7. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U. S. 17 (1947). Justices
Black and Murphy dissented. In the Belo case, supra, Justices Black, Murphy, Reed
and Douglas dissented.
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have ended the Administrator's efforts to disregard stipulated wage rates
where the basic requirements of the Belo doctrine were complied with.
But the Administrator continued to challenge guaranteed wage plans differ-
ing in any material way in their factual background from the Belo case.'
Thus, in the instant case the Administrator urged that the stipulated rate
was not bona fide because it was based on oral misunderstandings without a
written contract, and not necessitated by an inherent problem of widely
fluctuating hours.
Since the decision in the instant case, the doctrine of the Belo case has
been enacted into law.9 Thus, it would seem the policy of Copgress is to
encourage guarantees which will give employees with irregular hours of
work the security of a constant wage. The statute clearly legalizes a
stipulated regular rate of pay, in excess of the minimum, if the workweek
is irregular, the guarantee covers not more than 60 hours, and the contract
is bona fide. The instant case would seem to indicate that the Belo doc-
trine will be broadly construed, and that a contractual rate is bona fide
whenever the following elements are present: (a) strict observance and
application of the stipulated rate in any situation where the guarantee does
not apply; 10 (b) a reasonable number of instances in which the hours
actually worked dnecessary to earn etat  wage,
idl fpayment of addifioaal 150of the stipulated
rate; and (c some evidence that the stipulated rate bear a fair relation
to wage earning actualities, and is not a mere artifice to avoid payment
of overtime. 12
Landlord and Tenant-Federal Jurisdiction-Requirement of
Jurisdictional Amount in Private Action under Rent Act-In an action
by a tenant against his landlord under § 205, Housing and Rent Act of
8. See, in addition to the instant case, e. g., McComb v. Sterling Ice & Cold Storage
Co.. 165 F. 2d 265 (10th Cir. 1947) ; McComb v. Utica Knitting Mills, 164 F. 2d 670
(2d Cir. 1947).
9. Pub. L. No. 393, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (Oct. 26, 1949) (effective 90 days
after enactment) provides: "No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection
(a) by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of forty hours if such em-
ployee is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or pursuant to an
agreement made as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees,
if the duties of-such employee necessitate irregular hours of" work, and the contract or
agreement (1) specifies a regular rate of pay of not less than the minimum hourly
rate provided in section 6(a) and compensation at not less than one and one-half times
such rate for all hours worked in excess of forty in any workweek, and (2) provides
a weekly guaranty of pay for not more than sixty hours based on the rates so speci-
fied."
10. See, e. g., 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U. S. 199 (1947) (failure
to observe stipulated rate for part of week when hiring new employees).
11. In the Sterling Ice & Cold Storage Co. case, supra, the court refused to apply
the Belo doctrine where the record did not show any such instances. In the instant
case the Government asserted that less than 10% of the man-weeks of work exceeded
48 hours, the time covered by the guarantee.
12. The statutory enactment appears to extend the Belo doctrine to preclude any
question of bona fides when the regular rate is stipulated pursuant to a collective bar-
gaining agreement. See note 9 supra. On the other hand, it narrows the Belo doc-
trine by providing that the guarantee may not cover more than 60 hours. Cf. the
Halliburton case, suPra, in which more than 84 hours had to be worked before extra
compensation in addition to the guarantee had to be paid.
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1947,1 allowing treble damages for alleged overcharges of rent, the circuit
court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that the district court was without jurisdiction although the amount in-
volved was less than $3000. The court held that the Housing and Rent
Act contains a grant of general jurisdiction to federal courts over actions
to recover treble damages without regard to the jurisdictional amount.
Adler v. Northern Hotel Co., 175 F. 2d 619 (7th Cir. 1949).
Section 205 of the Housing and Rent Act provides that a tenant may
recover three times the amount of an intentional overcharge and "Suit
to recover such amount may be Brought in any Federal, State or Territorial
court of competent jurisdiction within one year after the date of such
violation." The problem of statutory construction presented is whether
"competent jurisdiction" restricts federal jurisdiction to cases where the
amount in controversy exceeds $3000. Congress has the power to author-
ize a suit arising under a federal law to be brought in any inferior federal
court irrespective of the amount in controversy.2 For example, the district
courts, have original jurisdiction of civil actions arising under any act of
Congress regulating commerce 3 or relating to patents, copyrights, and
trademarks 4 without regard to the amount involved. Likewise, the
original act imposing rent controls 5 provided not only that such treble
damage actions might be brought "in any court of competent jurisdiction"
but also that the district courts had jurisdiction concurrently with State
courts ". . . of all other proceedings . . ." 6 By virtue of this lan-
guage tenants recovered damages in district courts although the amounts
in controversy did not exceed $3000.7 It is contended that the modified
language of the subsequent Housing and Rent Act of 1947 makes the dis-
trict courts unavailable to recover small claims. The majority, holding
that tenants may recover rental overcharges in district courts irrespective
of the amount in controversy, construes the statute so as to effect the
Congressional objective, an effective remedy for overcharges.8
1. 61 STAT. 199 (1948), 50 U. S. C. § 1895 (Supp. 1949). Note that this dis-
cussion concerns suits by private parties rather than actions by the Housing Expediter
on behalf of the Government, as authorized by the Housing and Rent Act of 1949,
Pub. L. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. §204(a). There are different considerations
if the suit is by a public officer; United States v. Heller, 18 U. S. L. WEzEK 2191
(U. S. Oct. 10. 1949) ; see Fields v. Washington, 173 F. 2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1949);
Porter v. Montgomery, 163 F. 2d 211, 215 (3d Cir. 1947).
2. 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1948) ; see Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U. S.
619, 622 (1925).
3. 28 U. S. C. § 1337 (1948); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U. S.
201 (1918). But cf. Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp. 861, 865 (W. D. Mo. 1941).
4. 28 U. S. C. § 1338 (1948) ; Kasch v. Cliett, 247 Fed. 169 (5th Cir. 1924).
5. EMERGENCY PRTCE CONTROL AcT OF 1942, 56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 50
U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1946).
6. § 205 (c) (e) (italics supplied), 56 STAT. 23, 33 (1942), as amended, 50 U. S.
C. § 925 (1946).
7. The Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, spra note 6, contin-
ued this right to a treble damage action at least until June 30, 1947 [PRIcE CONTROL
ExTENSION ACT OF 1946, 60 STAT. 664, 50 U. S. C. § 966 (1946)]. Powell v. Rhine,
71 F. Sum). 953 (W. D. Pa. 1947) ; see, also, Strickland v. Sellers, 78 F. Supp. 274
(N. D. Tex. 1948).
8. The question has divided the lower federal courts. See Adams v. Backlund,
81 F. Supp. 643 (1948). Contra: Fields v. Washington, 173 F. 2d 701 (3d Cir. 1949) ;
McCrae v. Johnson, 84 F. Supp. 220 (D. Md. 1949). Another possible factor in the
instant decision is the fact that many cases have been filed in district courts under the
later act where the amount of damages claimed is less than $3000. A substantial
amount of the claims pending would be lost by a denial of jurisdiction under § 205 be-
cause the 1947 Act allows damage suits only within one year after the date of the vio-
lation.
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The significant dissenting opinion by Judge Minton, now Associate
Justice, United States Supreme Court, objects to disregarding the plain
meaning of the statute, i. e., the federal court must be one of "competent
jurisdiction" which by definition requires the amount in controversy to
exceed $3000. 9 This literal approach to construction obviates the necessity
for looking to the policy of Congress. The dogma is that if the language is
plain and allows only one meaning, the court may not look to other evidence
of intent as an aid to construction, for there is nothing to construe.'0 But
words are at best inexact symbols of meaning; 11 ambiguity is inherent in
their nature. If we consider the words alone, actually there is no such
thing as the plain meaning of a statute. Only by a consideration of all
evidence of intention can the court fulfill its obligation to give effect to the
determination of policy signified by a Congressional act.12 Giving words
a literal meaning without regard to the purpose to be effectuated is as
much judicial legislation as is the substitution of a judge's own conception
of policy for that manifested by the legislature. Congress, in giving the
overcharged tenant a right to sue for treble damages, intended to provide
a necessary incentive to tenant cooperation in discouraging violations of
rent controls.13 In many localities suits could be tried with less delay in
federal than iii state courts; moreover, local reluctance to enforce federally
created rights in regard to price and rent control 14 made a choice of forum
a desirable aid to enforcement. The amounts involved in rental over-
charges are admittedly small, both by nature and because a suit may be
brought only within one year of the violation. If "competent jurisdiction"
is construed to impose the jurisdictional amount, suits in federal courts are
reduced to nil.15 Nothing in the legislative history of the Housing and
Rent Act suggests any intent to change the previous remedy of an over-
charged tenant by barring access to federal court unless his claim exceeded
$3000. It is reasonable to infer that by ". . . Federal court . . . of
competent jurisdiction" Congress designated district courts of general juris-
diction rather than a federal court of appeal or the Court of Claims, but
did not impose a jurisdictional amount.' 6 This interpretation in accord
with the expressed policy of Congress is preferable to a literal construction
9. 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1948) ; see Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp. 861, 865 (W.
D. Mo. 1941).
10. E. q., Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U. S. 245, 253 (1929);
Work v. United States. 295 Fed. 225, 227 (D. C. Cir. 1924); Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1912). But cf. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States,
278 U. S. 41 (1928).
11. Chafee, Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COL. L. REV. 381 (1941).
12. See United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 562 (1930) ; Ozawa v. United
States, 260 U. S. 178, 194 (1922) ; Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COL. L. REv. 527 (1947).
13. See Bowles v. American Stores, 139 F. 2d 377, 379 (D. C. Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 322 U. S. 730 (1944). About 1000 private damage suits were terminated in
district courts in the fiscal year 1947. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DREcToaR OF THE
ADnINISTRAIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 75 (1947).
14. See Testa v. Katt, 71 R. I. 472, 47 A. 2d 312 (1946) for illustration of state
reluctance to take on enforcement of federally created rights. The state Supreme
Court reversed a judgment for treble damages under the Emergency Price Control
Act, § 205 (c) on the ground that the suit was for a penalty based on a statute of a
foreign sovereign and could not be maintained in the state courts. This was reversed
on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, 330 U. S. 386 (1947).
15. In order for a claim to amount to $3000, it is necessary that the monthly over-
charge be over $80; this is extremely uncommon.
16. "Conmpetent jurisdiction" as it modifies State or Territorial courts may im-
pose the jurisdictional amount since a right arising under a federal act may be enforced
as of right in state courts only if their jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is ade-
quate to the occasion. Seceond Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1911).
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of the words "competent jurisdiction" out of context. When the "plain
meaning" leads to a futile result or an unreasonable one, the court should
look beyond the words to the purpose of the act.
17
Partnership-Distribution of Deceased Partner's Interest in Firm
Realty Under the Uniform Partnership Act-Intestate had been a
partner in a firm which owned real estate. An infant heir claimed that
intestate's total interest in the land descended to her. The widow claimed
a share in the land on the ground that intestate's interest was personalty,
subject to the laws of distribution. The court, in sustaining the claim
of the widow, held that the legislature, in adopting the Uniform Partner-
ship Act, intended that all partnership property should be distributed as
personalty.' Cultura v. Cultura, 221 S. W. 2d 533 (Tenn. 1949).
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Partnership Act, the prevail-
ing view in America was that on dissolution of a partnership, a deceased
partner's interest in real estate descended to his heirs.2 In equity, partner-
ship realty was treated as personalty so far as it was necessary for paying
partnership debts and adjusting affairs. But as soon as winding up was
complete, any remaining real estate or residue from the sale thereof
resumed its character as realty.3 This equitable conversion pro tanto was
enforced to give the surviving partners access to firm realty since legal
title passed directly to the heirs. There were two exceptions to this rule.
If the firm were engaged in land speculation 4 or if it were the intention
of the partners that the realty should be treated as personalty, there was
said to be an "out and. out" conversion, i. e., partnership realty was re-
garded as personalty for all purposes, including descent and distribution.
In England and a few states, the rule of "out and out" conversion was
applied in all situations.6 It was said that the surviving partner "must
have an absolute and unconditional property and dominion over the estate
of the firm" to wind up affairs satisfactorily. 7 After the adoption of the
Uniform Partnership Act, the rule in some states was uncertain.8 A
Pennsylvania court, the first to construe the Act, held that §§ 25 and 26
clearly demand that the English rule of "out and out" conversion be fol-
17. See Chatwin v. United States, 326 U. S. 455 (1945) ; United States v. Ameri-
can Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 542 (1940).
1. UNIFORm PAMTNERS rP Acr §§25(2) (d), 25(2) (e), 26, 38(1).
2. E. .q., Shearer v. Shearer, 98 Mass. 107 (1867) ; Foster's Appeal, 74 Pa. 391,
15 Am. Rep. 553 (1874) ; Williamson v. Fontain, 66 Tenn. (7 Bax.) 212 (1874). See
Note, 25 A. L. R. 389, 390 (1923).
3. See note 2 sup ra.
4. E. g., Nicoll v. Ogden, 29 Ill. 323, 81 Am. Dec. 311 (1862) ; Patrick v. Patrick,
71 N. J. Eq. 347, 63 Adt. 848 (Ch. 1906).
5. Maddock v. Astbury, 32 N. J. Eq. 181 (Ch. 1880) ; Buckley v. Doig, 188 N. Y.
238, 80 N. E. 913 (1907).
6. England adopted the rule of "out and out" conversion by decision and by stat-
ute. Broom v. Broom, 3 Myl. & K. 443, 40 Eng. Rep. 169 (Ch. 1834) ; Partnership
Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vicr., c. 39, § 22. Ohio, South Dakota, and Virginia had followed
the English rule. See Note, 25 A. L. R. 389, 408 (1923).
7. Burdick, Partnership Realty, 9 COL. L. Rnv. 197, 203 (1909).
8. By the year 1949, twenty-eight states had adopted the Uniform Partnership
Act. Tennessee adopted the Act in 1917. See 7 UNIFORm LAws ANN. xv (1949).
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lowed.9 However, in affirming the decision, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania refused to rely on the Act, holding that the parties intended the
realty to be regarded as personalty.1 Although a Tennessee case said
that the Act did not affect the previous law,11 decisions in other states and
the instant case in Tennessee have construed the Act as did the lower court
in Pennsylvania.
12
It was clearly the intention of Dean Lewis, the draftsman of the Act,
that firm realty should be treated as personalty for all purposes. He
wrote, "This provision (§26) reverses the rule . . . of Shearer v.
Shearer which has been followed in most American jurisdictions." 13 In
following the English rule, recognition is given to business convenience
and practicality. Also, the method of approach to the problem of dis-
tribution of partnership realty is now clear and simple. A partner is co-
owner of partnership property, holding as a tenant in partnership and the
incidents of such an interest are listed in the Act.' 4 There is no longer
need for squeezing the tenancy of a partner into the term "tenancy in
common" and then adopting fictional conversions to obtain the desired
legal consequences. Nor do we have to adopt the "entity" theory of
partnership in order that a partner's interest may be called a chose in
action against the "entity," and therefore personal property.'5
Trade-Marks and Trade Names-Laches as a Defense Where
There Has Been No Interim Reliance-In 1908 Anheuser-Busch
sought an injunction to restrain defendant's use of his trade name "Bud-
weiser," but discontinued the action. In 1940 it brought the instant action
for the same purpose. In the interim the plaintiff had successfully pre-
vented others from using the same name and had spent over thirty five
million dollars in creating good will, while the defendant's production and
sales remained steady and its advertising expenditures small.1 The trial
court granted the injunction, but the circuit court, in reversing the decree,
held that the prolonged delay in bringing the action conferred immunity
on the defendant from the present suit. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois
Brewing Co., 175 F. 2d 370 (3d Cir. 1949).
In suits for unfair competition it is generally held that delay in bring-
ing suit, even though prolonged, does not constitute a complete defense,
9. In re Hall's Estate, 28 Pa. Dist. 311 (1918), af'd, 266 Pa. 312, 109 Atl. 697
(1920). UmIFoPm PARTNERSHIP AcT § 25(2) (d) (title to firm property vests ,in the
surviving partner), § 25(2) (e) (a partner's right to partnership property is not
subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances), § 26 (a partner's interest in the partnership
is his share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property).
10. In re Hall's Estate, supra.
11. Marks v. Marks, 1 Tenn. App. 436 (1925).
12. Wharf v. Wharf, 306 Ill. 79. 137 N. E. 446 (1922) ; Hankey v. French, 281
Mich. 454, 275 N. W. 206 (1937).
13. Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YA.LE L. J. 617, 637 (1915).
14. UmFORm PARTNERSHIP AcT § 25.
15. See Burdick, supra note 7, at 216.
1. Defendant's plant capacity had not been increased since before 1909. Its sales
of "Budweiser" beer were only 8 to 12% of total bottle sales and 8 to 30% of total
barrel sales. Average advertising expenditures for all of its products for the periods
1909 to 1919 and 1933 to 1945 was $11,500 per year. but the defendant did not show
what part of this was allocated to his "Budweiser." When compared to defendant's
sales of $1,862,174 in 1945 the amounts spent for advertising seem insignificant.
Nothing else was shown by the defendant to prove a change in position in reliance on
plaintiff's inaction. See findings of fact by trial judge, 73 F. Supp. 338 (W. D. Pa.
1947).
[Vol. 98
RECENT CASES
although it may bar an accounting or preliminary injunction.2 The reason-
ing behind this rule seems to be that since unfair competition is a con-
tinuing wrong, the evidence of the injury to the plaintiff is kept fresh
3
Thus, one of the basic reasons for which the statute of limitations makes
delay a defense is satisfied. The denial of an accounting is a convenient
and adequate punishment for the plaintiff's unexcused delay.4 The cases
show that in addition to the passage of time the defendant must prove facts
approaching an estoppel, i. e., a change in the defendant's position caused
by the plaintiff's failure to act.5 In such a case there is both a personal and
social interest in preserving the value of the defendant's efforts and ex-
penditures, and this may tip the balance of the equities in favor of the
defendant. 6 The present case is unique in the extreme length of the delay
and in the unchanged position of the defendant throughout the period.
The dissenting judge could-see no unfairness to the defendant in granting
the injunction since he had spent no money or otherwise committed him-
self in reliance on plaintiff's delay. The majority, however, felt that a
delay so prolonged would under any circumstances bar the plaintiff from
equitable relief.
The effect of denying injunctive relief in this case is to permit the
existence of two "Budweiser" beers side by side, a condition likely to cause
confusion in the minds of the public. The court could have enjoined this
deception by adopting the rule that mere delay is not a defense. However,
there is a growing belief that the' enforcement of trade name rights results
in more injury to the consuming public by restricting free competition 7
and raising the price of goods through wasteful advertising 8 than is caused
by allowing such confusion to continue. The judicial manifestation of the
growing unfriendly attitude toward legal protection against unfair com-
petition may be seen in a reluctance to enlarge the scope of the protection
2. Saxlelner v. Eisner, 179 U. S. 19 (1900) ; Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514
(1888); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245 (1877); Consolidated Home Specialties
Co. v. Plotkin. 358 Pa. 14, 55 A. 2d 404 (1947) ; Klepser v. Furry, 289 Pa. 152, 159,
137 Atl. 175, 177 (1927); 2 Nims, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 409,
413 (4th ed. 1947) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 751, comment d (1938).
3. Reid, Murdoch and Co. v. H. P. Coffee Co., 48 F. 2d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 1931).
4. DERENBERG, TRADE-MARx PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING 649 (1936).
5. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U. S. 514, 523 (1888) (The Court denied recovery of
damages for prior infringement because of delay, but said, "There is nothing here in
the nature of an estoppel, nothing which renders it inequitable to arrest at this stage
any further invasion of complainant's rights." The injunction was granted) ; Procter
and Gamble Co. v. J. L. Prescott Co., 102 F. 2d 773 (3d Cir. 1939) (8 year delay,
large expenditures by defendant for advertising; injunction denied. The court said
that had plaintiff sued before such expenditures were made, it would have been entitled
to injunctive relief) : Reid, Murdoch and Co. v. H. P. Coffee Co., 48 F. 2d 817 (8th
Cir. 1931) (5 year delay, no expenditures by defendant; injunction granted) ; see also
Rothman v. Grayhound Corp., 175 F. 2d 893 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Standard Oil Co. of
Colorado v. Standard Oil Co., 72 F. 2d 524, 527 (10th Cir. 1934) ; Beattie Mfg. Co. v.
Smith, 275 Fed. 164, 172 (2d Cir. 1921) ; 2 CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 87.3 (b) -87.3 (b) (3) (1945).
6. Procter and Gamble Co. v. J. L. Prescott Co., 102 F. 2d 773 (3d Cir. 1939);
Banker v. Ford Motor Co., 69 F. 2d 665 (3d Cir. 1934) ; Valvoline Oil Co. v. Havo-
line Oil Co., 211 Fed. 189 (S. D. N. Y. 1913). But cf. Layton Pure Food Co. v.
Church and Dwight Co., 182 Fed. 35, 41 (8th Cir. 1910).
7. Zlinkoff, Monopoly v. Competition, 53 YALE L. J. 514, 528 (1944) ; CHAMBER-
Lix, THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 246-50 (5th ed. 1946). Cf. National
Fruit Products Co. v. Dwinnel-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942); also
Callman, He Who ReaPs Where He Has Not Sozm: Unjust Erichient in the Law
of Unfair Competition, 55 HARv. L. Rxv. 595 (1938).
8. See Bourjois v. Hermida Laboratories, 106 F. 2d 174 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Brown,
Advertising and the Public Interest, 57 YAiE L. J. 1165 (1948).
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given to trade names,9 in increasing the burden on the plaintiff of proving
likelihood of confusion of source,' 0 and in lessening the defendant's burden
of establishing a defense."- Liberal use of the doctrine of laches presents
to the court desiring to advance free competition a tool for limiting the
protection of a trade name by denying injunctive relief.
Wills-Inscription at Top of Page as a Signature of a Holographic
Will-Testatrix, Ella McNair, executed an instrument in her own
handwriting which she began, "I, Ella McNair, . . . do hereby make
my last will." The instrument was comprised of three sheets, and at the
top of each testatrix wrote, "Will of Ella McNair", or, "Will, Ella Mc-
Nair". After numerous bequests, the writing ends abruptly in the middle
of the third page. The evdence tended strongly to show that the instru-
ment had been written in one sitting. It had been completed nineteen
months before testatrix's death, and was found in an envelope on which
she had written, "Will of Ella McNair." The court held that the instru-
ment was "signed" by the testatrix, 1 as required by statute.2 In re Mc-
Nair's Estate, 38 N. W. 2d 449 (S. D. 1949).
A few state statutes require that a holographic will be signed, or sub-
scribed, at the end of the instrument.3 However, the majority require only
that it be "signed"; the courts of most of these jurisdictions have followed
an early English case,4 holding that the place of the signature is im-
material.5 The doctrine which developed from this case was that the
really material factor was the intention that it serve as the testator's
signature,6 and not merely as a descriptio personae. The courts still profess
to make this the focal point of their decision, but the trend has been to
make the determinative test whether the testator intended the instrument
9. Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, 137 F. 2d 955 (2d Cir. 1943) ; S. C.
Johnson and Sons v. Johnson, 116 F. 2d 427 (2d Cir. 1940) ; see Triangle Publications
v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969, 981 (2d Cir. 1948) (dissenting opinion).
10. California Fruit' Growers Exchange v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F. 2d 971
(7th Cir. 1947).
11. Zlinkoff, supra note 7, at 531 states, "With increasing consistency the circuit
courts have rendered judgments for defendants, reversing district courts' rulings
awarding relief to plaintiffs, and restricting and casting doubt on their own decisions
in the earlier decade. Examination of all the circuit court cases in this field reveals
that the number in favor of the defendant greatly preponderates."
1. Judge Roberts and Judge Sickel dissented on the grounds that there was no
language in the document adopting the name as a signature for purposes of execution,
and that the form and contents did not raise any positive inference that testator so
intended it.
2. S. D. CoDE § 56.0209 (1939) defines a holographic will as follows: "An holo-
graphic will is one that is entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. . . . and need not be witnessed."
3. Borchers v. Borchers, 145 Ark. 426, 224 S. W. 729 (1920); Graham v. Ed-
wards. 162 Ky. 771, 173 S. W. 127 (1915) ; Kimmel's Estate, 278 Pa. 435, 123 At.
405 (1924).
4. Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1, 83 Eng. Rep. 545 (1681).
5. In re Henderson's Estate, 196 Cal. 623. 238 Pac. 938 (1925) ; Ex partq Car-
doza, 135 Md. 407, 109 Atl. 93 (1919) ; Reagan v. Stanley, 11 Lea 316 (Tenn. 1883) ;
Lawson v. Dawson's Estate, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 361, 53 'S. W. 64 (1899) ; Murguiondo
v. Nowlan's Ex'r., 115 Va. 160, 78 S. E. 600 (1913) ; see In re Brandow's Estate, 59
S. D. 364, 365, 240 N. W. 323, 324 (1932).
6. In re Devlin's Estate, 198 Cal. 721, 247 Pac. 577 (1926) ; In re Fisher's Estate,
47 Idaho 668. 279 Pac. 291 (1929); Rook v. Wilson, 142 Ind. 24, 41 N. E. 311 (1895);
Forrest v. Turner, 146 Va. 734, 133 S. E. 69 (1926).
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to be his will.7 Moreover, there is a split of authority as to what constitutes
expression of the requisite intent.8 The "true rule" as laid down in
Estate of Manchester 9 is that it must appear on the face of the document.
Since such an expression is rare, this rule has often been paid little more
than lip service. This is especially true when the court is trying to dis-
cover whether or not the testator intended the paper to be his will.10 These
courts have looked rather at such features as the time and place of writing,
the mental capacity or physical condition of the author, the phraseology
of the writing, and whether or not it purported to be a more or less com-
plete disposition of the author's holdings." The court in the instant case
has clearly followed this trend, since it seems doubtful that the signature
here was intended as one of authentication, as is required by the statute.
The purpose of admitting holographic wills to probate is to permit
those who either cannot get competent advice, or those who wish to keep
secret the disposition of their property, to make a valid will. The formal-
ities as to execution should effectuate this purpose and not defeat it.'
2
Granted, there should be some method of determining whether the testator
actually made a will and was not merely thinking about it on paper. How-
ever, the act of signing should not be the sine qua non, because that would
often defeat the intent of the testator, who is almost always totally un-
familiar with testamentary statutes.13 Nevertheless, courts, by insisting
on a strict interpretation of and literal compliance with the statute, often
frustrate the genuine intention of the testator.' 4  The courts are not the
only offenders, for legislatures have persisted in making the execution of
a will depend on a series of small acts described in ambiguous terms.
Because each instrument presented for probate has different features and
a different background, effectual detailed legislation in this field seems im-
possible. Accordingly, a substantial improvement could be made by dele-
gating to the courts a greater degree of discretion.' 5 Until such a legis-
7. In re Gardener's Estate, 84 Cal. App. 2d 394; 190 P. 2d 629 (1948) ; In re
Irvine's Estate, 114 Mont. 577, 139 P. 2d 489 (1943) ; In re Wallace's Will, 227 N. C.
459, 42 S. E. 2d 520 (1947). Contra: Elrod v. Purdin, 196 Okla. 120, 163 P. 2d 209
(1945).
8. Mechem, The Rule in Lemcayne v. Stanley, 29 MicH. L. Rav. 685 (1931); 28
MIcH. L. Rav. 355 (1930).
9. 174 Cal. 417, 163 Pac. 358 (1917). This has been made the subject of statutes
in Va. and W. Va. See Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills, 14 IowA L. REv. 1, 13
(1928).
10. See the dubious discoveries of the proper context in Estate of McMahon, 174
Cal. 423, 163 Pac. 669 (1917) ; Dinning v. Dinning, 102 Va. 467, 46 S. E. 473 (1904);
Mechem, supra note 8, at 696.
11. See In re McNair's Estate, 38 N. W. 2d 449, 455 (1949).
12. See Alexander v. Johnston, 171 N. C. 468, 469, 88 S. E. 785, 786 (1916).
13. "In the case of a holographic will, the crucial moment for the testator may
not be that at which he decides to sign his name or not, but rather that subsequent
moment when he decides whether to put the paper in the fire or in the safe." Mechem,
supra note 8, at 690.
14. The court in In re Tyrell's Estate, 17 Ariz. 418, 419, 153 Pac. 767, 768
(1915) quotes from an earlier case, "It may happen, even frequently, that genuine
wills, namely, wills truly expressing the intentions of the testators, are made without
observation of the required forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine intention
is frustrated by the act of the Legislature, of which the general object is to give effect
to the intention. . . ." See Mechem, supra note 8, at 697.
15. Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IowA L. Rav. 501, 503 (1948).
". . the philosophy should be to impose only such requirements as seem so unmis-
takably essential to a safe will-making process as to justify running the known risk
of defeating meritorious wills through failure of testators to know or comply with
the requirements. . . . careful attention should be given to the known habits of
testators (particularly untutored ones) as illustrated by the thousands of cases decided
since 1677."
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lative policy is forthcoming, the courts should use every power to treat
these instruments liberally in order to avoid unjust or absurd consequences
and to give effect to the testator's genuine attempt to dispose of his prop-
erty.16 By admitting a will to probate despite its questionable nature if
viewed strictly from the point of view of the statute, the instant case adds
impetus to a movement toward a more reasonable and more intelligent
treatment of holographic wills.
16. Thrift Trust Co. v. White, 90 Ind. App. 116, 118, 167 N. E. 141, 143 (1929).
"Good faith wills are solemn instruments, not to be set aside by the courts because
of mere irregularities as to form; they should be upheld when it is possible within the
law to do so." Cf. Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N. C. 360, 49 S. E. 2d 797, 801 (1948).
the court should consider the language of the statute, the mischiefs sought to
be avoided, and the remedies intended to be applied. . . . Furthermore, if words will
permit, the court should not adopt a construction which will lead to unjust, oppressive,
or absurd consequences."
